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I. Introduction
Thousands of Superfund sites - discovered and undiscovered - now dot
the American landscape.' The contaminated condition of these sites creates
a variety of risks and tempts some owners to transfer the property without dis-
closing the condition. While such sites are hardly the only (or the most dra-
matic) environmental hazards, they provide an example of common environ-
mental hazards and the problems faced by attorneys in complying with posi-
tive law and the duty of confidentiality.2 An attorney's nightmare related to
contaminated sites is that a client will refuse to inform a purchaser of the
existence of dangerous contamination. Imagine you represent a vendor of
realestate. You learn that the property to be sold is contaminated with hazard-
ous wastes and that the buyer is ignorant of this problem. Although both state
and federal statutes require owners to disclose environmental hazards, the
client refuses to reveal the dangers and forbids you to disclose any informa-
tion regarding the site. You fear that the contamination may cause injury for
the buyer and, additionally, that the buyer may sue you for damages resulting
from the contamination. What is your ethical duty?3 If an attorney knows that
her client has created environmental hazards that threaten others, should she
1. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
CLEANING UP HAZARDOus WASTES: ANOVERVIEWOF SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION IssuEs,
at 9-10, 21 (noting that between 1500 and 4170 sites await cleanup under federal programs and
indicating that number of sites could reach into hundreds of thousands); John P. Forde, Fore-
closures on Toxics Sites Pose Big Risks: Potential Liability Is Huge, Often Overlooked by
Banks, AMERICAN BANKER, May 31, 1988, at 17 ("In a recent study... the Environmental
Protection Agency said that, with some minor changes in its definition of contamination, the
number of cleanup sites could mushroom to between 400,000 and 600,000 nationwide."); see
also SAMUEL S. EPSTEIN ET AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA (1982) (describing some
problems caused by hazardous waste disposal).
2. In this Article, environmental hazards serve as examples dramatizing the risks of
attorney silence in the face of client conduct that endangers others.
3. Although lawyers are used to looking to the American Bar Association (ABA) ethical
rules as the applicable rules of ethics, the term should have a broader connotation. See GEOF-
FREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 1 (1978) (defining "ethics" as "impera-
tives regarding the welfare of others that are recognized as binding upon a person's conduct in
some more immediate and binding sense than law and in some more general and impersonal
sense than morals").
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disclose the dangers or maintain her silence in order to protect the client's
confidences?
The rules of ethics created by the American Bar Association provide little
guidance to the attorney facing the dilemma posed by client secrets that can
harm third parties.' Unless thejurisdiction makes the transfer described above
a crime,5 Model Rule 1.6 appears to require that the attorney remain silent
concerning the danger to the purchaser and his family - even if that danger is
likely to result in serious bodily injury or death.'
Considering the expansion of tort liability and the judicial abrogation of
the bar of privity for professionals in most jurisdictions, this nightmare
scenario could result in negative personal consequences for attorneys.7 The
potential for personal liability for lawyers is not trivial Additionally, devel-
oping tort law suggests that a professional may face liability for a failure to
warn third parties of dangers created by clients.
4. For a summary of recent cases in which attorneys have been charged with failing to
reveal client secrets that pose dangers, see Paul M. Barett, Silent Partners: When Lawyers See
Fraud at a Company, What Must They Do?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1997, at Al.
5. It is unlikely that the refusal to disclose this information is a crime. Although num-
erous states allow for avoidance of a contract to purchase property before conveyance when a
seller fails to disclose contamination, they do not invalidate a transfer based on a failure to
disclose information and they do not impose criminal penalties. Additionally, it would be diffi-
cult for an attorney to determine in a short time whether the client's actions fit the elements of
these statutes. See IDAHO CODE §§ 55-2515, 55-2517 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (providing for
rescission by transferee); IND. CODE §§ 24-4.6-2-10,24-4.6-2-13 (1996) (requiring that owner
submit disclosure to buyer before offer is accepted for sale and allowing buyer to nullify
contract within two business days of receipt of disclosure); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 565.954,
565.964 (1997) (allowing termination by written notice); see also Sarah L. Inderbitzin, Taking
the Burden Off the Buyer: A Survey of Hazardous Waste Disclosure Statutes, 1 ENVTL. LAW.
513,558 (1995) (arguing that buyer should have option of voiding transfer of property contami-
nated with hazardous wastes when seller failed to disclose contamination).
6. The Model Rules make clear that the attorney must not aid a client's fraud or crime,
must withdraw if the representation will result in a violation of law and may withdraw if the
client persists in wrongful conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2,
1.16, 4.1 (1997) [hereinafter MODEL RULE]. The MODEL RULES do allow the attorney to
disavow his work product if the client is using it to perpetrate a fraud. See MODEL RULES
Rule 1.16. For a discussion of withdrawal, see Ernest F. Lidge III, Client Perjury in Tennessee:
A MisguidedEthics Opinion, an AmendedRule, anda Callfor FurtherAction by the Tennessee
Supreme Court, 63 TENN. L. REV. 1, 47 (1995). The rules do nothing, however, to protect third
parties when the attorney learns of dangers after completing transfer documents. Moreover, if
the attorney learns of the dangers before her work is completed, the most she can do is disasso-
ciate herself from the seller under Rule 1.16 unless the fraud is also a crime subject to disclosure
under Rule 1.6(b)(1).
7. SeegenerallyJLB. Ruhl, Malpractice and EnvironmentalLaw: ShouldEnvironmental
Law "Specialists"Be Worried?, 33 Hous. L. REv. 173 (1996).
8. See Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.,Rectification ofClientFraud: Death andRevival ofaPro-
fessionalNorm, 33 EMORYL.J. 271, 283-84 (1984) (noting risks to lawyers offraud by clients).
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Our system of laws seeks to minimize risks in a variety of ways. Positive
law requires disclosure of environmental hazards by the owner or person in
charge of a site.9 Both statutes and the common law create prohibitions and
sanctions as a means of controlling unreasonable risks. Environmental statutes
recognize the unreasonable risks created by environmental hazards and create
incentives to minimize these risks. The common law also seeks to reduce
risks (both environmental risks and other sorts of risks), generally by imposing
liability for conduct deemed negligent or otherwise culpable. It encourages
due care by imposing liability for harm that results from a defendant's cre-
ation of unreasonable risk of harm to others.
Despite the predominance of positive law in our system ofjustice, Model
Rule 1.6 fails to acknowledge the force of judicial or statutory law and sets a
standard of confidentiality separate and unhinged from the mandates of posi-
tive law. This Article explores the disjuncture of positive law and the duty of
confidentiality as formulated by Model Rule 1.6. Its central purpose is to
question the decision to exclude positive law from the framework of analysis
created by the Rule. Part II of the Article summarizes the duty of confidential-
ity owed to clients by attorneys. Part III examines Model Rule 1.6, studying
the Rule's text, its origins in a rule proposed by the Kutak Commission, and
other legislative history. It focuses on the deletion of two exceptions from the
Proposed Rule on confidentiality: (1) the exception allowing disclosures to
comply with the law, and (2) the exception allowing disclosures of client
fraud that will result in serious harm. Because environmental hazards present
pressing problems of application of the ethical rule, Parts IV and V explore
the mandates of positive law in this context. Part IV surveys environmental
statutes, noting the strong public policy in favor of protection against environ-
mental hazards. Part V explores common law liability, noting the effect of
recent developments in the law such as the abrogation of the bar of privity and
the growth of the concept of the professional's duty to warn third parties of
dangers created by a client. Part VI considers the need for viable exceptions
to the prohibition against disclosure. It summarizes state modifications to
Model Rule 1.6 and examines the Proposed Rule of the Restatement (Third)
9. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) (as amended by the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)) § 3008(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3) (1994) (knowing
omission of material information or falsely filing required RCRA report subject to criminal
penalties); SWDA § 3008(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. §§6928(d)(4) (1994) (knowing failure to file record
or report or document required under SWDA subject to criminal penalties); Clean Air Act
§ 113(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (1994) (knowing omission of information or failure to
report releases required under the Clean Air Act subject to criminal penalties); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) § 103(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603(b) (1994) (knowing failure to report release subject to CERCLA notification require-
ments subject to criminal penalties).
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of the Law- The Law GoverningLawyers. Finally, Part VI suggests areassess-
ment of Model Rule 1.6 in light of positive law, including both statutory law
and common law.
I. The Duty of Confidentiality
The duty of confidentiality is one of the oldest and most basic tenets of
the legal profession.'0 The principle of confidentiality is central to the attor-
ney's duty of loyalty to the client. Additionally, the duty serves to insure the
free flow of information between clients and attorneys." Although the duty
is central to the attorney-client relationship, it has not been viewed tradition-
ally as an absolute. 2 "Counsel's duty of loyalty to, and advocacy of, the
defendant's cause is limited to legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the
very nature of a trial as a search for truth."'3 In 1983 the American Bar
Association (ABA) adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. These
Rules provide the most current statement of the ethical obligations of attor-
neys by the leading professional association for lawyers in the United States.
Model Rule 1.6 is the ABA's articulation of the attorney's duty to protect
client confidences.
III Model Rule 1.6
Model Rule 1.6 sets forth the balance endorsed by the ABA regarding
the attorney's duty to protect client information and the right of the attorney
to reveal client information in unusual circumstances implicating other
interests. Controversy has surrounded Model Rule 1.6 from its beginnings.14
10. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERNLEGAL ETHICS § 6.7.3, at 299 (1986); Harry I.
Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA
L. REV. 1091, 1096 (1985).
11. See WOLFRAM, supra note 10, §§ 6.7.1-.3, at 296-300 (1986).
12. The duty does not require an attorney to assist a client's fraud or to allow it to go
unpunished. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 158 (1986); State v. Metcalf, 540 P.2d 459,
465 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (holding attorney-client privilege inapplicable to advice sought in
furtherance of crime or fraud); see also MODEL RULES Rule 1.2; 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.,
& W. WILLIAM HODEs, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULE OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT§ 1.6:109, at 168.1-.4 (1997); WOLFRAM, supranote 10, § 6.1.4, at245.
13. Nix, 475 U.S. at 158.
14. See Robert H. Aronson, An Overview ofthe Law ofProfessional Responsibility: The
Rules of Professional Conduct Annotated and Analyzed, 61 WASH. L. REv. 823, 831 (1986)
("The rules that have been most controversial throughout the country and which are the least
justifiable as enacted in the [Model Rules], are [Model Rules] Rule 1.6 and 3.3 dealing with the
tension between the lawyer's duties of candor and confidentiality."); see also Marvin G.
Pickholz, The Proposed Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct- and Other Assaults Upon the
Attorney-ClientRelationship: Does "Serving the Public Interest"Disserve the Public Interest?,
36 Bus. LAW. 1841, 1842 (1981).
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Although nearly four-fifths of the states have adopted the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, the vast majority of these states rejected or modified
Rule 1.6.15 The legal profession has questioned the policy choices of Model
Rule 1.6. Legal scholars have criticized the categorical nature of Model
Rule 1.6 and its failure to consider third party interests in the balance with
clients' needs.16 The body of criticism of Rule 1.6 is significant and grow-
ing. 7 In 1991, the ABA Committee on Ethics proposed amending Rule 1.6.18
15. See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Michie 1997-98); ARiz. RULESOFPROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); ARK.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Michie 1996); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule
1.6 (1997); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); D.C. RULEOFPROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); FLA. RULESOFPROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6 (1997); HAw. RULESOF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); IDAHORULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Supp. 1997);
IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1997); KY. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule
1.6 (West 1996); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); Miss. RULES
OFPROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); Mo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); MONT.
RULEOFPROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); NEV. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCTRule 156 (1995);
N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1997); N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 16-106 (Michie 1996); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 4 (1997); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); OKLA. RULES.OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); R.I. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Law. Co-op
1997); S.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Michie 1995); TEX. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.05 (1997); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); WASH. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); Wis.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT SCR 20:1.6 (1997); WYo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(Michie 1997).
16. See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 1.6:102, at 130.2 (noting that "literature
on the soundness of the adversary system" and "moral ambiguity of simply being a lawyer" -
frequent topics of news and scholarly articles today - focus on issue of confidentiality).
17. See id. § 1.6:110, at 168.4 (explaining provisions deleted in final ABA rule "must
exist in the responsible practice of law"); WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 301 (asserting that it is
"hardly imaginable that [Model Rule] 1.6 should be read literally to prohibit a lawyer from
revealing absolutely any information about a client except in the limited exceptions explicitly
provided in the rule"); see also Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client,
69 GEo. L.J. 1015, 1027 (1981); W. William Hodes, The Code ofProfessionalResponsibility,
the KutakRules, and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 739, 745 (1981); Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study ofLawyer
Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERSL. REV. 81, 102-06 (1994); Harry
I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70
IOWA L. REv. 1091, 1096 (1985); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 351,396 (1989).
18. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't
Get It, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 701, 721-24 (1993).
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The Proposed Restatement (Third) of the Law- The Law Governing Lawyers
rejects the categorical approach of the Model Rules. 9 Recently, Professor
Monroe Freedman called for a new exception to the rule to allow attorneys to
reveal confidences to protect the lives of third parties."
A. The Text of the Rule
The text of Model Rule 1.6 provides:
Confidentiality of Information.
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and
except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;
or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.21
Rule 1.6 prohibits attorneys from revealing any information relating to
a client.' The exceptions to this prohibition empower the attorney to disclose
information in two situations: (1) to prevent the client from committing a
crime that is likely to result in "imminent death or substantial bodily harm,"'
and (2) to protect attorney interests. Although each of the exceptions is
permissive, the elements of the provisions create vastly different effects. The
second exception is broad, allowing liberal disclosure to protect attorney
interests.2 This exception reaches most conceivable situations in which the
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW- THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); see also infra notes 298-316 and accompanying text.
20. See Monroe H. Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception to Confidentiality: Restating
Law Without the Was, the Will Be, or the Ought To Be, 29 LoY.L.A.L.REv. 1631, 1636(1996).
21. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6.
22. Additionally, the scope of the duty of confidentiality is broadened by Rule 1.6's use
ofthe term "information" rather than the traditional terms "confidences and secrets" used in the
Model Code. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE].
23. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(1). In this Article, the term "serious crimes" is a
shorthand reference to the exceptions stated in Rule 1.6(b).
24. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(2).
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attorney would wish to disclose client information to protect his own inter-
ests.' It allows disclosure when the attorney reasonably believes a revelation
is necessary to establish a claim or defense on his behalf in a suit by the
attorney, by the client or by some third party. This liberal disclosure excep-
tion gives the attorney the power necessary to protect his own interests. By
contrast, the exception for dangerous crimes constrains the attorney's discre-
tion. This exception is narrowly drawn to apply only when an extreme
consequence, such as imminent death or substantial bodily harm, is present in
conjunction with the most reprehensible conduct - commission of a crime.26
The Rule invests the attorney with the discretion to choose to disclose client
information only when these two elements coalesce.
B. The Message of the Rule
Although Rule 1.6 permits disclosure in described exceptions, it appears
to advocate silence in virtually all circumstances.2 The categorical nature of
the Rule depends on careful drafting. On its surface the Rule presents the
familiar paradigm of general rule and exceptions. But while the general Rule
is plain and powerful, the exceptions defy confident application. The general
Rule is a flat prohibition against disclosure of client information. It is clear
cut and mandatory. By contrast, the exceptions to the prohibition are permis-
sive. And the exception for serious crimes is far from clear cut; it depends on
imponderable elements such as whether the client intends a crime that will
result in "imminent death." Moreover, the uncertainty inherent in all future
acts is used by the Rule to caution attorneys against disclosure.28 The Rule
neither requires nor encourages disclosure in any situation. The comments to
the Rule acknowledge that a client may pose harm to others and that the
attorney may not be successful in dissuading the client from harmful conduct
in every case.29 Nevertheless, in no case does the Rule set a normative stan-
25. Some exception for attorneys seems necessary because, without it, an attorney could
never defend against a claim by a client or collect a fee.
26. The Proposed Draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Law - The Law Governing
Lawyers also includes the requirement that the client conduct creating peril be a criminal act.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW -THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117A (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (authorizing disclosure of confidential client information to prevent
"death or serious bodily injury from occurring as the result of a crime that the client has
committed or intends to commit").
27. The momentum of Rule 1.6 seems to encourage silence to such an extent that the
attorney who makes the decision to reveal client information does so outside the operation of
the rule. See infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
28. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6 cmt. 13.
29. The Model Rules' primary response to concerns about harm to others is that generally
it is better for attorneys to be able to counsel clients to comply with the law. See MODEL RULES
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dard or state that an attorney should disclose client information."0 Addition-
ally, in a comment to a related rule, Rule 1.2, it is clear that dangers to third
parties are outside any normative role for the attorney. Rule 1.2 addresses the
"Scope of Representation" and drives home the pointthat attorneys should not
take into consideration third-party interests. "The lawyer should assume
responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the
client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for
third persons who might be adversely affected."31
Although the Model Rules prohibit attorneys from aiding a client's crime
or fraud,32 they never encourage action by the attorney to counter client
wrongdoing.33 Whatever the future crime -transfer of contaminated property
or the bombing of the World Trade Centerx4 - Rule 1.6 creates no norm for
disclosure. Proponents of Rule 1.6 argued that this broad duty is necessary to
prevent the legal system from using lawyers as "policemen" of their clients."
Proponents also believed that the flat prohibition was necessary to "encourage
fuller and franker communication between a lawyer and client,"36 and to
Rule 1.6 cmt. 9; see also MODEL RULES Preamble 7; CENTERFORPROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, AM.
BARASS'N, THELEGISLATIVEHISTORYOFTHEMODELRULESOFPROFESSIONALCONDUcT: THEIR
DEvELOPMENTINTHEABAHOUsEOFDELEGATES 13 (1987) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVEHISTORY].
30. The Model Rules has numerous uses ofthe word "should," but none is used in relation
to the disclosure situation. Rule 1.6 provides no guidance in identifying a situation thatjustifies
disclosure. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 22.
31. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt. I (emphasis added).
32. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3. Additionally, a lawyer may be liable for failure to
disclose information. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer Liability in Third Party Situations:
The Meaning of the Kaye Scholer Case, 26 AKRON L. REV. 395, 399 (1993). "A lawyer can be
held liable under criminal law for aiding or abetting a crime, including the crime of fraud. A
lawyer also can be held civilly liable on essentially the same terms." Id.
33. See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 1.6:302, at 168.49 (noting that in area of
client fraud "command of Rule 1.6(b)(1) as adopted is clear[;] ... lawyers who have mere
knowledge of an impending client fraud, and who cannot plausibly be charged with participa-
tion or facilitation must suffer in silence").
34. Although it is admittedly unlikely that one planning such an act would inform his
attorney of his plans, the Rule gives no norm for attorney disclosure in the event this unlikely
contingency occurs.
35. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 48.
36. Id.; see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). Comment 4 to Rule 1.6 states the purposes of encour-
aging clients to "communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or
legally damaging subject matter." MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 4. In arguing for deletion of the
exception for fraudulent conduct likely to injure another, the consensus of the discussion of the
ABA House of Delegates was that such an amendment "would encourage fuller and franker
communication between a lawyer and client by narrowing the circumstances in which the lawyer
could disclose client confidences." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 48.
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encourage people to seek advice from lawyers.37
In becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee that
the client intends serious harm to another person. However, to the extent a
lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's purposes, the client will
be inhibited from revealing facts which would enable the lawyer to counsel
against a wrongful course of action. The public is better protected if full
and open communication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited. 8
Although the drafters recognized that a client may intend "serious harm"
to others, they concluded that the social good is best served by silence.
"Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the
advice given, and the law is upheld."39
Likewise, the Scope section of the ABA Rules advises against judicial
evaluation of the attorney's decision not to disclose client information: "The
lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose information under Rule 1.6
should not be subject to reexamination."40 This suggestion ofjudicial restraint
states a clear preference for the duty of confidentiality over positive law.
Similarly, Comment 20 to Rule 1.6 states a presumption in favor of nondis-
closure.
C. Acknowledgement of Positive Law
The Model Rules acknowledge positive law in a limited way. The Pre-
amble to the Model Rules states: "A lawyer should keep in confidence infor-
mation relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is
required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."'"
This statement acknowledges the attorney's duty to obey the law. The rules
themselves do not, however, mention such an exception to comply with law.
In discussing the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, Comment 19 to Rule 1.6
does note the existence of authority outside the Model Rules.42
37. The Rule "not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper repre-
sentation of the client but also encourages people to seek early legal representation." MODEL
RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 2; see also Board of Prof'l Responsibility of the S. Ct. of Tenn., Formal
Op. 85-F-99 (1985).
38. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 9.
39. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 3; see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 52.
40. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 23.
41. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The Preamble also acknowledged the importance of
conscience in a lawyer's decision making: "Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are
prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law.
However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional
peers." MODEL RULES Preamble 5.
42. "[A] lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law to give informa-
tion about a client." MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 20; see 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12,
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The attorney-client privilege is differently defined in various jurisdictions.
If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client,
absent waiver by the client, Rule 1.6(a) requires the lawyer to invoke the
privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final
orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the
lawyer to give information about the client.
43
This comment notes the existence of positive law, but it does so in a markedly
circumscribed manner. It notes the attorney's duty to comply "with the final
orders ofa court or othertribunal."' Although this statement endorses limited
disclosure, it falls short of creating an exception to comply with positive law.
The appearance of this point in the comment rather than the Rule minimizes
its importance both because it is easy for the reader to miss the point alto-
gether and because comments are merely explanatory.45 More important,
Comment 19 to Rule 1.6 authorizes disclosure only in the case of a court
order; it does not authorize compliance with positive law established by
statutes or judicial decisions. Thus, the Model Rules appear to accept law as
a basis for disclosure only when a court has made a finding relating to the law
in the present case. This limitation takes the decision regarding application
of the law out of the hands of the attorney with knowledge of a violation of a
statute or the common law by his client. He cannot provide the information
that would support a court order until such an order exists, presumably based
on the same information from some other source. Similarly, Comment 20 to
Rule 1.6 refers to other law outside the Model Rules.46 It states:
The Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or
require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation. In
addition to these provisions, alawyermaybe obligated orpermittedby other
provisions of law to give information about a client. Whether anotherprovi-
sion oflaw supersedes Rule 1.6 is amatterofinterpretationbeyondthe scope
ofthese Rules, butapresumption should exist against such a supersession.47
The strength of the ABA's aversion to disclosure is clear from this Com-
ment's statement of the presumption against a suppression of other laws and
§ AP4:103, at 1260-61 (asserting that exception for disclosures "required by law" must be
provided by interpretation).
43. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 19.
44. Id.
45. Comments do not create obligations within the scheme of the Model Rules: "Com-
ments do not add obligations to the Rules." MODEL RULES Scope 11. The Scope section of the
Model Rules also notes that disciplinary action should not be taken for actions within the
bounds of attorney discretion. Id.
46. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6, cmt. 20.
47. Id.
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the fact that all roads lead back to the labyrinth of Rule 1.6 for the determina-
tion concerning whether disclosure should be made. Although Comment 20
acknowledges the possibility of disclosures based on other rules, none of these
other rules call for disclosure in situations that do not meet the requirements
of Rule 1.6. In fact, Rule 4.1 expressly limits the obligation of the attorney
to disclose a "material fact to a third person," stating that disclosure must be
made "unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6. '
One might argue that it is not necessary for the text of the Model Rule 1.6
to reference positive law or the fact that positive law trumps the Rule. The
predominance of positive law does not depend on Rule 1.6 and the force of
positive law makes such a reference unnecessary. Along this line, one would
reason, the Rule deals with its proper sphere of operation and leaves alone
matters outside its scope. Nevertheless, the deletion of the reference to the
attorney's duty to comply with positive law is significant. It renders disclo-
sure unlikely despite risks to third parties because of the hermeneutical chal-
lenge of applying the Rule.
D. Legislative History: Deletion of References to Positive Law
In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
superseding the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) of 1969." 9
Model Rule 1.6 was the most debated provision of the proposed rules before
the ABA House of Delegates." The Rule departed dramatically from the
previous institutional statement of the duty of confidentiality set forth in the
ABA Code, and as adopted, it rejected significant exceptions specified by the
Commission that had drafted the rules to be considered by the ABA House of
Delegates.
The ABA Code gave greater discretion to attorneys considering the issue
of confidentiality. The duty of confidentiality defined by the Code encom-
48. Id.atRule4.1.
49. In 1978, the ABA added the designation "Model" to the title of the Code in compli-
ance with a settlement agreement it entered with the Justice Department to resolve antitrust
charges. See WOLFRAM, supra note 10, § 2.6, at 57 (1986). The Code superseded the Canons
of Professional Ethics of 1908, the ABA's first statement of legal ethics. See AMERICANBAR
ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT vii (1996).
50. See I HAZARD&HODES, supra note 12, § 1.6:101, at 127 ("By awidemargin, Rule 1.6
was the most controversial rule during the drafting and adoption process."); Aronson, supra
note 14, at 831 (describing Rules 1.6 and 3.3 as "most controversial throughout the country"
and "least justifiable"); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and Choice ofLaw in the Regu-
lation ofLegal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 91 (1997) (noting that Rule 1.6 is "most amended
provision" of the Model Rules).
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passes" client confidences and secrets." The Code allows disclosure of client
secrets or confidences when permitted under the Disciplinary Rules53 or when
required by law or by a court order. 4 Under the Code an attorney may reveal
"the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary
to prevent the crime."55
ProposedRule 1.6, drafted bythe Kutak Commission, provided asfollows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and
except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act
that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or sub-
stantial bodily harm, or in substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another;
(2) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act
in the furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used;
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense to a
criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary complaint against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved; or
(4) to comply with other law. 6
51. Ten states have retained the Model Code. See GA. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
DR 4-101 (1996); IOWA CODEOFPROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1996); MASS. CANONS OF
ETIncs DR 4-101 (1996); NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (West 1995); N.Y.
CODEOF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1995); OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR
4-101 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); OR. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1996); TENN.
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1995); VT. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR
4-101 (1995); VA. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1996). Vermont and Virginia
are considering adoption of the Model Rules. See generally A. Jeffry Taylor, Essay, Work in
Progress: The Vermont Rules ofProfessional Conduct, 20 VT. L. REv. 901 (1996); Proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, VA. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 38, 38.
52. See MODEL CODE DR 4-101.
53. See id. atDR4-101 (C)(2). This exception requires balancing the duty ofconfidential-
ity against other professional duties, permitting the attorney to reveal a confidence when another
section of the Code would allow the revelation. See id. DR.-101(B)(2), DR 7-102.
54. See id. atDR4-101(C)(2). This exception may include both statutory mandates such
as reporting requirements of environmental releases or hazards and duties arising from tort law.
See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 1.6:113, at 168.9.
55. MODEL CODEDR 4-101. The provision does not qualify the type of crime justifying
disclosure. Id.; see STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 55 (1995).
56. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 47-48.
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In addition to allowing attorneys to make disclosures necessary to establish
a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer, the Proposed Rule drafted by the
Kutak Commission allowed attorneys to disclose client information to prevent
serious harm from a client's threatened crime or fraud, to rectify serious harm
from such acts, and to comply with other law. Indeed, as originally drafted,
the Kutak Commission Rule imposed a duty of disclosure on attorneys when
necessary to protect another person or to comply with the law."
During the process of debate and ratification of the Model Rules, the
House of Delegates either dispensed with or substantially narrowed each of
the exceptions in the Proposed Rule except for the attorney self-defense
exception. These changes came about primarily as a result of criticism from
the American College of Trial Lawyers. 8 The ABA House of Delegates'
amendments made attorney disclosure of client information more difficult. 9
During the February 1983 Midyear Meeting,60 the Delegates deleted the
Proposed Rule 1.6(b)(4) exception, which permitted disclosures necessary "to
comply with other law."61
E. The Effect of Deletion of References to Positive Law
In addition to the Model Rules' reference to positive law in the Preamble,
scholars have suggested that Model Rule 1.6 must implicitly allow disclosures
required by positive law. 2 Shortly after the passage of the Model Rules,
Professor Hazard noted that "an innocent lawyer cannot take care of himself
in a client fraud situation unless he has some kind of out."'63 Because of the
57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (Discussion Draft 1980).
Originally the Rule on confidentiality was numbered 1.7. Specifically the discussion rule
provided as follows: "a lawyer shall disclose information about a client to the extent that it
appears necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that will result in death or serious
bodily harm to another person, and to the extent required by law or the rules of professional
conduct." Id. (emphasis added).
58. 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § AP4:103, at 1260. "The ABA House of Dele-
gates retained the basic structure of Rule 1.6 but rejected most of the exceptions to confidential-
ity that had been proposed [by the Kutak Commission]." Id.
59. See generally Irma S. Russell, Cries and Whispers, Environmental Hazards, Model
Rule 1.6, and the Attorney's Conflicting Duties to Clients and Others, 72 WASH. L. REV. 409,
433-44 (1997) (examining each ofthe changes to Rule 1.6). For a thorough history ofthe ABA
Rules, see Hodes, supra note 17.
60. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 48.
61. Ultimately, comments 19 and 20 added limited acknowledgement ofpositive law. See
id. at 54-55.
62. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a
Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 285 (1984).
63. Id.
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peril posed to the innocent lawyer by client fraud, Professor Hazard rejected
the literal meaning of Rule 1.6 and advocated recognition of an exception "in
practice" for disclosure of a client's fraud.
[The] peril to the innocent lawyer is so obvious as to impugn the serious-
ness of the notion that competent lawyers can take care of themselves
under a confidentiality rule that does not have an exception concerning
client fraud. In pondering the rhetoric in favor of such a rule, I indeed
conclude that [Model Rule 1.6] is not intended to be taken seriously. In-
stead, the idea is that the confidentiality rule should state no qualifications
concerning client fraud, but should be understood as having an exception
"in practice."'
However necessary, no "in practice" exception is implied by the language or
structure of the Rule. The text of the Rule suggests no exception for the attor-
ney's protection. Explication of the Rule indicates that an exception for
disclosure necessary to comply with positive law must be implied from
outside rather than from the force of the language of the Rule.6 Like the
implied-in-law promise recognized in contract law, the exception comes from
necessity and fairness rather than from the intent of the drafters of the docu-
ment.67
One may well ask what difference it makes whether the exception is
found in the Rule or imposed from outside the Rule. Because the predomi-
nance of positive law is established outside the Rules and acknowledged in
a general way by the Model Rules, 6 the power of positive law should be
64. Id. at 284-85.
65. See 1 HAZARD& HODES, supra note 12, § 1.6:112, at 168.7 (noting that Rule fails to
"survive even linguistic analysis" unless duty to comply with other law is acknowledged).
66. This seems analogous to an implied-in-law promise that is created by a court as
opposed to an implied-in-fact promise that inheres in the agreement between parties. The
implied-in-law promise is not necessary as a matter of implication of the parties but must be
created by a court to achieve the court's (and society's) view of fairness. See JOHN EDWARD
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTs 181-83 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing implied-in-law
contracts).
67. See Artukovich & Sons v. Reliance Truck Co., 614 P.2d 327, 329 (Ariz. 1980)
(noting that implied-in-law contract is "imposed for the purpose of bringing about justice
without reference to the intentions of the parties"); see also Willard L. Boyd, III, & Robert K.
Huffmnan, The Treatment of Implied-in-Law and Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Promissory
Estoppel in the United States Claims Court, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 605, 606-09 (1991) (stating
that implied-in-law contracts have "no requirement" of "mutuality of intent or mutual assent").
68. The Scope statement to the Model Rules notes: "The Rules presuppose a larger legal
context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes... substantive and procedural law in
general." MODEL RULES Scope 2. "A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating
to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law." MODEL RULES Preamble 3.
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clear.69 Attorneys are not exempt from positive law by virtue of rules of
ethics7" and they know that the duty of confidentiality does not mean they can
ignore positive law. Positive law embodied in either statutory law or the
common law trumps ethics rules.71 Legislators are empowered to proscribe
conduct of all persons within their jurisdictions and courts apply the law
despite conflicts with ethical rules created by a bar association.72 Accord-
ingly, the argument runs, deletion of the exception for client fraud and refer-
ences to positive law should have no effect on the obligations of attorneys.
Nevertheless, the failure of Model Rule 1.6 to acknowledge the fact and
power of positive law creates a disconnect between ethics rule and positive
law that can result in both abstract and concrete problems. Deletion of
references to positive law minimizes the significance of positive law and
diminishes the likelihood that an attorney will fully analyze her duties under
statutory or common law principles.' The universe of the Rules includes no
placeholder or hook for considering positive law. Thus, the categories of
acknowledged exceptions obscure the backdrop of substantive law and its
relation to the attorney's decision, suggesting that the full inquiry on confiden-
tiality is accomplished within the confines of the Rule.74 The analysis of a
disclosure issue seems complete within the universe constructed by Model
Rule 1.6, without reference to external positive law.
Choosing a covert exception for client fraud or dangerous conduct is
evidence of the strong preference for silence held by the drafters of the Model
Rules. Reliance by attorneys on a covert or hidden exception for the "out"
needed to protect them is risky, however. A covert exception is hard to
discover and hard to apply. Thus, such an exception is far from reliable.
69. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmts.
70. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 13 (noting that self-regulation must be
adequate to avoid government regulation); see also I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12,
§ 1.6:109, at 168.1-.2 (noting that"the operation of law external to the law of lawyering- other
law - will sometimes 'force' further exceptions, regardless of what a disciplinary code might
say").
71. See 1 HAZARD& HODES, supra note 12, §§ 1.6:103-06, at 134-63; Hodes, supra note
17, at 758-60; Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C.L. REV. 1389,
1411-12 (1992).
72. See David B. Wilkins, In Defense OfLaw AndMorality: Why Lawyers Should Have
A Prima Facie Duty To Obey The Law, 38 WM. &MARY L. REV. 269,276-77 (1996); see also
Koniak, supra note 71, at 1412 (indicating that courts "often state that the only instances in
which they are bound to treat the ethics rules as binding precepts are in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers").
73. See Koniak, supra note 71, at 1413-14 (noting that MODEL RULES "contain no explicit
statement on the general hierarchy ofnorms" and even suggestthat they supersede positive law).
74. The Model Code specifically noted the predominance of positive law in its text. See
MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 20.
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According to Professor Llewellyn, "covert tools are never reliable tools. 75
The social utility of employing such an exception is open to question. Is an
implicit or covert exception sufficient to protect third parties and attorneys
from client misconduct? Will the attorney facing the dilemma of whether
disclosure is appropriate divine the existence of an implicit exception? In a
situation of urgency will the attorney be able to plumb the issue sufficiently
to discover the argument for this unstated exception?
Attorneys face a difficult choice when positive law appears to require
disclosure.76 Model Rule 1.6 provides no basis for analyzing a contest be-
tween positive law and Rule 1.6, and the Scope section underscores the
message of silence by declaring that the attorney's "exercise of discretion not
to disclose information under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to reexamina-
tion. 77 Rather than protecting attorney discretion in a content-neutral man-
ner, this statement seeks to insulate an attorney's decision from review by
courts or state boards of professional responsibility in one circumstance:
when the attorney decides not to reveal client information. It urges judicial
restraint only in the circumstance of attorney silence. Control of attorneys is
properly within the realm of courts and, to some extent, legislatures.7' Bar
associations have taken up the work in this area by a kind of implied delega-
tion from the courts. 9 However, such delegation should not be interpreted as
75. K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939). Professor
Llewellyn made this statement in the context of criticizing the practice of courts to construe
language to reach a desired result rather than overtly refusing to enforce unconscionable
contracts. Id. He criticized covert construction as leading to "unnecessary confusion and
unpredictability." Id. He also noted that such construction fails to "accumulate either experi-
ence or authority in the needed direction." Id. In legislating a categorical rule, the ABA may
have fallen into the same pitfall.
76. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1064 (1978) (noting that confusion in client confidentiality
area is "compounded" by fact that ABA "has taken a quite different approach to attorney-client
confidentiality"); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and
Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 EMoRY L.J. 271, 293 (1984) (discussing Model Rule 1.6
and noting that Model Code is "almost totally incoherent on the subject" of client fraud).
77. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 23.
78. Although courts have primary responsibility for controlling the conduct of attorneys,
legislatures can also control attorneys so long as they do not impinge on the authority of the
judicial branch. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 12, § 1.6:103, at 134 (stating that, in
context of constitutional protections of those accused, "it is safe to say little more than that a
state could not constitutionally abolish the rule of confidentiality ... in criminal cases").
79. A criticism against reporting requirements has been that the legislation impermissibly
tampers with the separate branch ofthejudiciary. "[T1hrough mandatory child abuse reporting
laws, we are experimenting with the use of attorneys as crime detectors and informants and
concomitantly encroaching on the legal protections for attorney-client confidences." Robert P.
Mosteller, ChildAbuse ReportingLaws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the
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elevating the bar's judgment above that of courts. Notwithstanding the
ABA's entreaty against reexamining the decision to remain silent,"0 courts, as
the arbiters of disputes, should consider both statutory and common law in
determining disputes - even when the defendant is an attorney. Accordingly,
it seems appropriate to consider Rule 1.6 in light of positive law.
IV Statutory Protection Against Environmental Hazards
Model Rule 1.6 is based on an assumption that clients will not inform
their attorneys of all relevant information absent a strong rule in favor of
confidentiality. Environmental scholars suggest that the public's paramount
interest in a safe environment should influence professional responsibility in
the environmental area. This Part considers the application of the duty of
confidentiality in the context of environmental hazards, noting the strong
policy favoring environmental protection in legislative action, judicial en-
forcement of statutes, prosecution initiatives and public opinion.
A. The Risks
Undisclosed contamination of real estate is only one example of the
environmental hazards present today. Environmental hazards are diverse as
well as numerous." Over two billion pounds of hazardous substances are
Specter ofLawyer as Informant, 42 DUKEL.J. 203,207 (1992). This criticism seems inapposite
when applied to judicial decisions because of the valid assumption that courts can and should
control attorneys.
80. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 23.
81. See George W. Van Cleve, Environmental Law in the 1990's and Its Principal
Implications for Professional Responsibility, ENVTL. LITIG., C534 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 405, 408
(1990) (stating that "full measure of professional responsibility here is that members of the bar
should assist the public in its effort to become stewards for the environment"); Fred C. Zacha-
rias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 169, 200 (1997) (suggesting
separate rules of ethics related to environmental and other matters where third party interests
are implicated).
82. Hazardous substances are pervasive in the United States and the world today.
Regarding catastrophic environmental disasters, some monumental ones (worse
than Bhopal) have occurred in this country but have been slow and subtle enough
to be categorized differently. The most obvious one is the dissemination of ciga-
rettes, which through lung, breast and bladder cancer, emphysema, heart disease,
stroke and hypertension have killed many millions -probably the largest environ-
mental disaster to date and the largest cause of early death in the developed world.
Another is the gradual destruction of the ozone layer leading to a melanoma
epidemic and extinctions among amphibians.
Letter from Robert Hutchison, M.D., Asst. Professor of Pathology, State University of New
York (SUNY) Health Science Center, Syracuse, to Irma S. Russell, Asst. Professor, Cecil C.
Humphreys School of Law, University of Memphis (September 13, 1997) (on file with author).
MODEL RULE 1.6 AND POSITIVE LAW
produced in this country each year.83 Despite advances in technology, dis-
posal and storage of hazardous substances present intractable problems."
According to the EPA, seventeen accidental chemical releases in the United
States from 1982 to 1986 had the potential for results as tragic as the Union
Carbide spill in Bhopal, India."5 The dangers posed by environmental hazards
are exacerbated by the fact that, to a large extent, environmental compliance
and enforcement depend on self-monitoring and disclosure.8 6
83. The figures for release of toxic substances subject to the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act have decreased in recentyears. The EPA recently reported that
in 1994 releases of toxic substances declined by 8.6 percent. See 1994 Toxics Release Inven-
tory, Public Data Release; see also Emergency Planning: Toxic Chemical Releases Decrease
By 8.6Percent in 1994, Report Says, [May 1996-Apr. 1997 File Binder] 27 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 10, at 531 (July 5, 1996). Nonetheless, the amount of toxic chemicals is still substantial:
2.26 billion pounds in 1994. Id.
84. Recently, the House of Representatives passed a bill that would create an interim
storage site for radioactive waste in the Yucca Mountain in Nevada. See Radioactive Waste:
House Passes Legislation to Create Interim Waste Storage Facility in Nevada, 28 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 27, at 1337-38 (Nov. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Radioactive Waste]. Although the
government has studied the Yucca Mountain site for a permanent disposal area for more than
12 years, the House Bill indicates that the study of the area must continue. See Radioactive
Waste Revision of Nuclear Waste Policy Act Sought [May 1996-Apr. 1997 File Binder], 27
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1771-72 (Jan. 24, 1997); Radioactive Waste, supra, at 1337.
"Under the measure (HR 1270), DOE also would be required to continue characterization
activities at Yucca Mountain... to determine its suitability as a permanent repository for waste
generated by commercial nuclear power plants and government defense-related activities." Id.
Meanwhile, production of hazardous substances (including radioactive wastes) continues to
increase despite waste reduction incentives created by state and federal agencies. The three sites
that inspired the passage ofCERCLA-Love Canal, Times Beach, and the Valley of the Drums,
in Bullit County, Ky. - have only recently completed clean up under the act. See Superfund:
Remediation Complete at Times Beach; Site Helped Inspire Passage ofStatute, 28 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 11, at 474-75 (July 11, 1997).
85. See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 134-35 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3519-20; see also Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: "Dead Zones"and Toxic Death Risk
Index Taxes, 53 OIuo ST. L.J. 761, 793-94 (1991) (arguing that during period of EPA study,
firms "were not allocating sufficient resources to safety").
These [American] events had caused 309 deaths, 11,341 injuries and the evacuation
of 464,677 people from homes and jobs....
... EPA analyzed 29 events with the highest potential for damage to health and
the environment. These events were compared to the release at Bhopal, India, which
killed 3,000 and injured over 200,000. Considering only the toxicity and volume
of the chemicals released in the 29 U.S. events, 17 of these events had the potential
for more damage than Bhopal and all 29 had a potential of 50 percent or more of
the Bhopal effects. That few were killed or injured in these accidents (650 people
were injured in one event and 5 killed in another) is due principally to the location
of the facilities and climate and operating conditions at the time of the release.
S. REP. No. 101-228, at 134-35 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3519-20.
86. See Marianne Lavelle, EPA 's Amnesty Has Become a Mixed Blessing, NAT'L L.J.,
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B. Environmental Policy: Political Will and Positive Law
1. Legislation
Both federal and state governments have indicated a strong interest in
protecting the public from environmental hazards. The prescriptive nature of
environmental laws indicates the strength of this interest.8 7 Federal laws
require that persons report hazardous releases and environmental contamina-
tion within prescribed time limits.88 Statutes set levels for permitted dis-
charges of pollution 9 and prescribe technology to reduce the discharge of
pollutants.90 They also set standards to require the clean up of contaminated
property.9' Statutes provide for punishment of those who fail or refuse to
control environmental risks at prescribed levels and by prescribed mecha-
nisms.'
Feb. 24, 1997, at Al (noting need for amnesty because many violations go undetected). See
generally W.M. vON ZHAREN, ISO 14000: UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS
(1996). The fact that self-reporting is a requirement of environmental laws enhances the need
for good counsel from attorneys regarding the obligation to report hazardous releases. See
generally F. Henry Habicht, II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforce-
ment: How to Remain on the Civil Side, [1987 File BinderNews & Analysis] 17 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) at 10,478 (Dec. 1987).
87. Highly specific environmental requirements control industry practices. Additionally,
some laws and regulations now reach private enterprises that have an effect on the environment.
For example, HUD and EPA recently issued regulations that require disclosure of lead-based
paint on leases and sales of housing constructed before 1978. See 24 C.F.R. § 35.8 (1997). The
prescriptive nature of these laws provides a contrast to the nonnormative stance of Rule 1.6.
88. See CERCLA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1994) (requiring any person in charge
of vessel or facility to report release of hazardous substance "as soon as he has knowledge of
any release" in specified quantities); Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (PPA) § 6607(b)(1), (3),
(7), 42 U.S.C. § 13106(b)(1), (3), (7) (1994) (requiring annual report of chemicals discharged
into environment); see also United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir. 1989) (conclud-
ing that person "in charge" of facility must report release of hazardous substances).
89. Under the Clean Water Act (also known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act),
the owner or operator of any discharger of pollutants must record and report information about
discharges into the waters of the United States. See Clean Water Act §§ 308(a), 502(14), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1318(a), 1362(14) (1994). Under the Clean Air Act, the owner or operator of a
source of acid deposition must monitor and report all emissions to the state permitting authority.
See Clean Air Act §§ 412(a), 502, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651k(a), 7661a (1994).
90. For example, the Clean Air Act requires auto makers to reports compliance with
specifications for controlling auto emissions. See Clean Air Act § 208(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7542(a).
The Clean Air Act also requires that new stationary sources of air pollution meet technology
standards set by EPA. See Clean Air Act § 11 l(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(2).
91. CERCLA requires that contamination at a site listed as a superfund site be cleaned
up to levels consistent with the National Contingency Plan promulgated by the EPA. See
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
92. See infra notes 112-13.
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Although environmental crimes are sometimes referred to as regulatory
in nature,93 violations of environmental law can result in catastrophes. State
and federal environmental statutes provide both civil and criminal sanctions,
including imprisonment for knowing violations.94 Under the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA), for example, one who knowingly
transports hazardous waste to an unpermitted facility or disposes of haz-
ardous waste without a permit is guilty of a felony.95 Punishment for such
violations includes imprisonment for up to five years and fines of up to
$50,000 per day.96 A violator convicted of a subsequent similar violation can
face a prison term of up to ten years and fines twice the maximum for first-
time offenders.97
Environmental statutes are based on a legislative judgment that certain
activities affecting the environment and public welfare are unreasonably
dangerous. Such statutes seek to minimize the unreasonable risk posed by
environmental hazards. Although laws regulating the environment have
existed throughout the history of the United States,98 the government has
93. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits ofthe Law: An Exercise in the Juris-
prudence and Ethics ofLawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1551 (1995) (noting environmental
violation as example of regulatory violation in "the Broad Middle Ground" when determining
attorney's obligation is difficult).
94. In recent years, legislatures have increased civil penalties for violation of federal and
state environmental laws. SeeAirPollution: New Civil Penalty Policy WillBoost Fines, Speed
Processing of Cases, EPA Attorney Says, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 2327 (Feb. 7, 1992);
Enforcement: Corporations Face IncreasedPenalties UnderRevisedRCR Civil Enforcement
Policy, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1245 (Nov. 2, 1990). Additionally, judicial doctrines
on enforcement have resulted in liability that extends beyond dissolution of the corporation in
some circumstances. See Joel R. Burcat & Craig P. Wilson, Post-Dissolution Liability of
Corporations and Their Shareholders Under CERCLA, 50 Bus. LAW. 1273, 1285-91 (1995)
(discussing cases that apply "dead and buried" rule to allow CERCLA suits against dissolved
corporations).
95. See SWDA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1994); Sidney M. Wolf, Finding an
Environmental Felon under the Corporate Veil: The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
andRCRA, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 24 (1993) (noting relaxation of scienter requirement
in environmental statutes).
96. See SWDA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d). Environmental fine structures also seek
to defeat the benefits of violating the law by setting penalties at an amount that is twice the
economic benefit to the violator of engaging in the violation or twice the loss suffered by the
public in the event of a violation. See id.
97. See id.
98. See J. William Futrell, The History ofEnvironmentalLaw, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
FROMRESOuRCESTORECOVERY2, 4-6 (Celia Campbell-Mohn etal. eds. 1993). Environmen-
tal law as we know it would not have been possible without the development of administrative
law and principles of"judicial review of government actions." JOHN E. BONTNE & THOMAS 0.
McGARiTY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION viii (2d ed. 1992).
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 117 (1998)
sought to control environmental hazards in a comprehensive manner only in
the last three decades.99 "Over the last two decades, the growing conviction
by our citizens that pollution is an intolerable social and physical evil has led
to strong legislation, resulting in a pervasive statutory scheme for regulation
of activities that affect the environment." "o
Concern about environmental risks has grown as the public has learned
about the magnitude of the risks... and the pervasive nature of environmental
hazards." 2 Although no federal law expressly endorses a right to a clean
environment," 3 Congress and state legislatures have passed numerous acts
99. See David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundations ofEnvir-
onmental Law in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 145-46 (1995) (noting
beginnings of environmental movement and support for criminalization of polluting behavior
in 1960s); Jeff Gimpel, Note, The Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Act of 1995: Regulatory
Reform and the Legislation of Science, 23 J. LEGIS. 61, 61 (1997) (noting "broad and interre-
lated network" of statutes developed over past 35 years).
100. Van Cleve, supra note 81, at 408.
101. Some have charged that the EPA used public concern to promote additional laws and
regulations. See MICHAELB. GERRARD, WHOSEBACKYARD, WHoSERISK: FEARANDFAIRNESS
IN Toxic AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 12 (1995). "The EPA, which had for some time been
advocating a new statute to control inactive hazardous waste disposal sites, used the massive
publicity generated by the Love Canal incident to push through Congress the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act." Id. (footnote omitted).
102. The Exxon Valdez disaster "triggered a national reassessment of the laws and regula-
tions relating to accidental releases of hazardous substances." Thomas S. West et al., Accident
Prevention and Emergency Response Planning Under the Clean Air Act: Emerging Require-
ments, [May 1993-Apr. 1994 Current Developments File Binder] 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34,
at 1555 (Dec. 24, 1993). Despite the dramatic damage done by the Exxon disaster, worse spills
have occurred and cumulative spills dwarf the Exxon case. In December of 1989, the amount
of oil spilled off the coast of Morocco was 186% of the amount of oil spilled by the Exxon
Valdez. See Harper's Index, HARPER'S, Mar. 1990, at 19. By March 1991, only eight percent
of the oil from the Valdez had been removed. See Harper's Index, HARPER'S, Apr. 1991, at 15.
103. Early drafts of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) included declarations
of the right of American citizens to a clean environment. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 91-765, at
8 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751, 2768 (noting that language of Senate bill stated
that "each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment" and that
this language was deleted in compromise resulting in final legislation). In 1994, after the failure
of the Environmental Justice Act, President Clinton issued an Executive Order to promote
environmental justice. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1994). The Order was conceived as an "administrative solution[] to the inequi-
table distribution of environmental hazards" burdening minorities and the poor. See Gerald
Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431, 434
(1994). While declaring that each federal agency "shall make environmental justice part of its
mission," the Executive Order refused to create or acknowledge a right to a clean environment.
Exec. OrderNo. 12,898, § 1-101. "This order is intended only to improve the internal manage-
ment of the executive branch and is not intended to, nor does it create any right, benefit, or trust
responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity." Id. § 6-609.
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protective of the environment. From 1964 to 1980, Congress responded to a
growing public consensus by enacting the basic canon of environmental
protection. 104 After these protections were in place, Congress "pressed ahead
with significant amendments"' 5 to the major statutes and state legislatures
continued to pass a wide array of statutes aimed at protecting the environment
and the public." 6 Although the system of federal environmental laws has
received criticism0 7 federal statutes attempt to form a comprehensive frame-
work of environmental protection.' In passing the numerous protective
environmental statutes, state and federal legislatures have recognized the
crucial need for protection of human health and the environment. For exam-
104. The acts included the Water Conservation Act of 1964, the Wilderness Act of 1964,
theNational Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Clean AirAct of 1972, the Clean Water Act
of 1972, the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism:
Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1160-61 (1995).
105. BONiNE & MCGARITY, supra note 98, at ix.
106. After the basic canon ofenvironmental statutes relating to pollution control came into
force, more stringent provisions palsed state and federal legislatures. See Carol E. Dinkins,
Criminal Enforcement ofEnvironmental Regulations: The Genesis ofEnvironmentalEnforce-
ment Through Criminal Sanction, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AvoIDING AND
DEFENDING ENFORCEMENT ACTIoNs 13 (Donald A. Carr ed. 1995); Futrell, supra note 98, at
35.
107. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. BREYER, BREAKING THE Vicious CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFEC-
TIVE RISK REGULATION 8, 42-43 (1993) (referring to "alphabet soup of agencies and pro-
grams"); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1231 (1995)
(calling federal environmental law "irrational potpourri" of statutes); Richard B. Stewart, United
States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 586 (1996)
(criticizing "the elaborate system of regulatory commands" set forth by federal environmental
statutes).
108. One group of statutes deal with the control of deposit or release of hazardous
substances into the media of the planet: the air, water and soil. These statutes include the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q
(1994); SWDA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994); and CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994). A group of statutes control particularly hazardous substances. These include the Toxic
Substance Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994); the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994); the Oil Pollution Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994); SWDA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k; and CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675. The third group of statues seeks to protect resources deemed to be particularly
fragile or in need of special intervention to preserve them. In this category are the Forest and
Rangeland Renewable Resources Acts, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1994); the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994); the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994); the Clean WaterAct provisions that afford protection
to wetlands, known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1994); the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-718j (1994); and other acts
aimed at protecting specific resources. See, e.g., The Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and
Burrows Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994).
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pie, the text of the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) indicates the preeminence of environmental
concerns represented by this legislation in declaring its sanctions "[n]otwith-
standing any other provision or rule of law.""9
The foregoing environmental policies establish in a general way the
strong public policy interest in safety from environmental hazards. Environ-
mental statutes and regulations also create a legal obligation on the part of an
owner or operator of property to disclose information relating to environmen-
tal hazards or environmental damage. These policies undercut the owner's
interest in confidentiality, requiring that the owner (the attorney's client)
abandon secrecy with respect to such hazards. For example, under the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, facilities that produce, handle or store ex-
tremely hazardous substances must assess the dangers of such substances.
The Amendments require that operators formulate a hazard assessment plan
to outline and evaluate the potential for release and to determine "downwind
109. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). The strength of the legislative
judgment of danger - and its financial ramifications - is also evident in the controls imposed
on corporations by the Securities and Exchange Commission Act. Although the SEC does not
require companies to disclose their general environmental policies, it does require disclosure
of conditions that constitute a "materially adverse condition." Id. The strength of the legislative
judgment of danger can also be seen in the controls imposed on corporations by the Securities
and Exchange Commission Act. Although the SEC does not require companies to disclose their
general environmental policies, it does require disclosure of conditions that affect the financial
status of the companies. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1997) (requiring disclosure relating to
liquidity, capital resources, results of operations); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ch. 404,
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994) (noting general prohibition againstfraud); 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-
5 (1997) (requiring disclosure of particular events or conditions when mandated or when facts
are of "sufficient significance to affect decision making by reasonable investors"). But see John
W. Bagby et al., How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environmental
Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 266-67 (1995) (citations omitted).
The Securities Act of 1933 is specifically intended to "provide full and fair disclo-
sure of the character of securities.., to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for
other purposes." The courts have interpreted this mission to optimize corporate
financial and non-financial disclosures and thereby provide investors with adequate
information to make reasonable trading decisions. The SEC is empowered to
provide detailed guidance on the form and content of disclosure... as the SEC
deems "necessary or appropriate in the public interest for the protection of inves-
tors." The SEC itself is sometimes willing to expand beyond this purpose of
advancing "informed investor trading" by recognizing "that appropriate publicity
tends to deter questionable practices and to elevate standards of business conduct,"
a position echoed by distinguished commentators. However, the SEC's experience
in addressing the disclosure of environmental liability exhibits greater emphasis on
the former goal even as it appears that its recent disclosure mandates would support
the latter.
Id. (citations omitted).
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effects, including potential exposure to affected population.""' In other
words, companies that store or use hazardous substances must now tell the
government - and citizens who seek this information under the Community
Right to Know Act or The Freedom of Information Act - what would happen
to people in the vicinity of the facility in the event of an accident."' Legisla-
tures have also revealed a strong policy of protection through the imposition
of criminal penalties. Both federal and state environmental statutes criminal-
ize the knowing failure or refusal to comply with environmental reporting
requirements." 2 Many environmental statutes declare that a criminal violation
constitutes a separate offense for each day it continues."'
Support for environmental protection does not appear to be a passing
fad."4 Americans and the government have begun taking environmental
110. Clean Air Act § 112(r)(7)(B)(ii)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii)(I) (1994).
111. See Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA)
§ 313,42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1994). Additionally, the Administrator of EPA must promulgate a
list of substances deemed extremely hazardous under the Act. The EPA promulgated the first
such list 1993. See 58 Fed. Reg. 5102-19 (1993). EPA has promulgated a final rule adding 286
chemicals to the list of chemicals that must be reported under EPCRA. See 59 Fed. Reg.
61,432-01 (1994). For a thorough treatment of the risks present in the practices of storage and
use of extremely hazardous substances in the United States, see Mank, supra note 85, at 762
(arguing that tax on industry is necessary to force U.S. industries to create buffer zones and to
internalize costs of preventing catastrophic accidents).
112. For example, the Clean Air Act classifies as a felony any knowing failure to make
required reports or keep records of compliance. See Clean Air Act § 113(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(c)(2). Likewise, the Tennessee Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1977, TENN.
CODEANN. §§ 68-212-101 to -121 (1996), and the Tennessee Hazardous Waste Management
Act of 1983, TENN. CODEANN. §§ 68-212-201 to -224 (1996) authorize criminal penalties for
knowingly providing false reports to state authorities. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-212-114,
68-212-213 (1996). The Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act, TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 68-215-101 to -128 (1996), also authorizes criminal penalties. See TENN. CODEANN.
§ 68-215-120 (1996).
113. See Clean Water Act § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C.§ 1319(c)(1) (1994) (authorizing
fine of $2,500 to $25,000 "per day of violation"); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-213
(1996).
114. See James Gerstenzang, GOP Clouds the Future ofEnvironmentalProtections; Regu-
lation: Conservatives See a Chance to Ease Tough Antipollution Rules. But They Risk a Popu-
lar Backlash, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1995, at A1; see also Bill Line, What Voters Say About the
Environment Today: Poll Shows Widespread Support for Green Causes, 21 E.P.A. J. 17, 17
(1995); State Official Sees Tight Squeeze for Carb Gas, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Mar. 27,
1995, at 3. In a 1994 poll of 1,201 people who had voted in the 1994 presidential election, 41%
of those polled agreed that existing laws "don't go far enough in protecting the environment."
Line, supra, at 17. Only 18% said that environmental regulations "go too far." 1d. Of those
polled, 76% favored strengthening drinking water laws. Id. See generally Everett Caril Ladd &
Karlyn Bowman, Public Opinion on the Environment, RESOURCES, Summer 1996, at 5 (noting
that significant numbers of Americans are "committed to a safe and healthful environment").
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dangers seriously."5 Public opinion polls indicate that Americans consistently
favor maintaining the environmental protections established over the last two
decades. "6 In response to public demand, Congress has enacted strict controls
on hazardous substances" 7 through laws that regulate dischargers and punish
individuals who knowingly violate" 8 environmental regulations.
The environmental policies noted above are strong. They address issues
that have the possibility of creating long-term and far-reaching harm. Never-
115. "The American people have made clear their desire to have clean air- air which is
safe to breathe, which does not harm trees, lakes and coastal waters, and which doesn't pose a
threat of a Bhopal type accident in the United States." S. REP. No. 101-228, at 406 (1989),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,3788 (statement of Senator Frank Lautenberg in support
of S. 1630); see also Gary Vajda, Pollution Prevention Through Total Quality Management,
in ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY HANDBOOK 347,355 (Kenneth W. Ayers et al.
eds. 1994).
116. Recent plans to reform existing environmental protection have met with public
disapproval. See Jim Nichols, Revisionists Retreat: Republicans Back OffTouted Reform of
Environmental Law in Light of Polls Showing Support for Protection of Resources, PLAIN
DEALER, Oct. 22, 1995, at lB. "The GOP phalanx is retreating in the face of public-opinion
polls that show Americans are more protective of the environment than some regulatory revi-
sionists previously believed." Id.; see also Brad Knickerbocker, Americans Go "Lite Green",
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 18, 1995, at Al ("Americans still favor strong environmental
protection."); Jessica Mathews, Battlefor the Environment, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1995, atA21
(noting that "[p]olls show solid to overwhelming opposition to environmental rollbacks").
117. For example, the Clean Air Act requires a risk management plan relating to extremely
hazardous substances. The plan must be prepared and implemented by owners or operators of
"stationary sources at which a regulated substance is present in more than a threshold quantity"
and also must include "a hazard assessment to assess the potential effects of an accidental
release of any regulated substance." Clean Air Act § 112(r)(7)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(B).
This assessment must include the following: (1) an estimate of potential release quantities, (2) a
determination of downwind effects, (3) a previous release history of the past five years, and
(4) an evaluation of worst case accidental releases. See Clean Air Act § l12(r)(7)(B)(I), 42
U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(I); see also James R. Arnold, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities
to Government Agencies and Third Parties, IMPACT OF ENvTL. L., C831 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 585,
603-04 (1993) (explaining requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)).
118. See Futrell, supra note 98, at 45; John F. Seymour, Civil and Criminal Liability of
Corporate Officers under Federal Environmental Laws, [May 1989-Apr. 1990 Current Devel-
opments File Binder] 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 337 (June 9, 1989); see also Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding excavator liable under CERCLA as "transporter" of hazardous substance); United
States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting duty under CERCLA of persons "in
charge" to report release of hazardous substances includes persons of relatively low rank in
position to detect, prevent and abate release of hazardous substances); Ganton Techs., Inc. v.
Quadion Corp., 834 F. Supp. 1018, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding contractor hired to clean up
hazardous waste liable as "operator" under CERCLA); International Union, United Auto.
Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v: Amerace Corp., 740 F. Supp. 1072, 1080
(D.N.J. 1990) (stating that presence of regulated pollutant must be reported under Clean Water
Act regardless of whether permit requires monitoring).
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theless, these policies arguably are no stronger than the general policies of
prevention of crimes that create physical peril for individuals or groups.
Indeed, all legal obligations should be a reflection of important social policy.
Rather than presenting a unique demand for disclosure, public policy argu-
ments for disclosure of environmental hazards simply provide a new and
sometimes startling context for evaluating the confidentiality rule.
2. Interpretation and Enforcement of Environmental Statutes
Prosecutors and courts as well as regulators have recognized the public
interest represented in this area.'19 Courts have frequently interpreted environ-
mental statutes liberally. 2 In Midatlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department ofEnvironmentalProtection, 121 the United States Supreme Court
noted the importance the goals of the Comprehensive Environmental Recov-
ery, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).122 Other courts have read
this environmental statute broadly in light of its remedial purpose."
119. Recently, EPA increased the maximum civil and administrative penalties by
10%. See Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule, 40 C.F.R. pt. 19 (1997); Blake
A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have
the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 285-97
(1996) (suggesting that courts interpret CERCLA too broadly by recourse to remedial purpose
of act).
120. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 667 (3d Cir. 1984)
(applying criminal provision to employee who was not owner or operator). "[Tihough the result
may appear harsh, it is well established that criminal penalties attached to regulatory statutes
intended to protect public health, in contrast to statutes based on common law crimes, are to
be construed to effectuate the regulatory purpose." Id. at 666.
121. 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
122. See Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
502 (1986) (holding that Chapter 7 liquidating trustee lacked power to abandon property in
bankruptcy estate when property was contaminated with PCBs because to abandon property
would endanger public safety). "Where the Bankruptcy Code has conferred special powers
upon the trustee and where there was no common-law limitation on that power, Congress has
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal and distribute the assets of the estate
must yield to governmental interest in public health and safety." Id.
123. See Idylwoods Assocs. v. Mader Capital, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1290, 1303 (W.D.N.Y.
1996) (stating that "the reasoning followed by the majority of courts is that Congress intended
that CERCLA provide for broad liability, and that CERCLA should supersede other laws or
rules that would ordinarily limit that liability"). "[M]ere dissolution should not be allowed to
block further inquiry into the status of the identifiable resources of the companies responsible
forthat pollution." Id. at 1303-04; see also John CopelandNagle, CERCLA 'sMistakes, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1405, 1437-40 (1997) (criticizing judicial reliance on purpose interpretation
of CERCLA).
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Enforcement of environmental laws has increased over the last decade, 24
with greater interaction and cooperation between local, state, and federal
agencies and organizations"z and increased use of criminal sanctions.'26 State
prosecutors, the EPA and the Department of Justice have instituted enforce-
ment programs 127 to investigate and convict those who violate environmental
laws.'28 Since the time Congress instituted criminal penalties, a significant
124. The EPA's enforcement efforts have evolved from administrative negotiation to
greater use ofjudicial enforcement. EPA has increased enforcement, using a combination of
criminal and civil penalties, and administrative remedies. See JOEL A. MINTz, ENFORCEMENT
ATTHEEPA 134(1995). However, some scholars have noted a retreat by the courts from liberal
enforcement of environmental protections. See Futrell, supra note 98, at 43-44; Robert Glicks-
man & Christopher H. Schroeder, Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 249, 249 (Autumn 1991) (noting thatjudicial enthusiasm for environmental protection
has been replaced by "neutrality toward environmental values" and "skepticism about whether
environmental legislation expresses coherent public policy").
125. See generally James E. McElfish, Jr., State Hazardous Waste Crimes, 17 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10465 (1987); Seymour, supra note 118, at 337. Federal, state, and local
enforcement agencies have begun cooperative programs aimed'at escalating the levels of
enforcement for environmental crimes. See THEODOREM. HAlvETT& JOEL EPSTEIN, LOCAL
PROSECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME 19-25 (1993). For example, the FBI, EPA, the
Department of Justice and U.S. District Attorneys have acted in conjunction to develop training
programs and to carry out investigations of environmental crimes. Id. at 33-37. Local police
and fire departments report violations uncovered in routine inspections or in efforts directed at
enforcing unrelated laws such as drug laws. Id.
126. See John F. Cooney et al., Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 25 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,459, 10,462 (1995), (citing Memorandum from Peggy Hutchins,
Paralegal to Ronald A. Sarachan, Chief, Environmental Crimes Section, Environmental Crim-
inal Statistics FY 1983 Through FY 1994 (Apr.7, 1995)).
The number of environmental crimes criminally prosecuted over the last decade has
been significant.
From the crucial events of October 1982 until April 7, 1995, Justice obtained
indictments against 443 corporations and 1,068 individuals. During that time, 334
organizations were convicted by plea or verdict. Justice recovered $297 million in
criminal penalties, $125 million of which was obtained from the Exxon Valdez oil
spill alone. Sentences totalling 561 years of imprisonment (not counting actual
time served) were imposed against those convicted.
Id.
127. Until the 1980s, enforcement of statutes was accomplished by civil enforcement
despite the existence of criminal sanctions in the statutes. See Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating
Environmental Protection Into Legal Rules and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 867, 868-69 (1994). See generally DONALD A. CARR ET AL., ENVIRONMEN-
TAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AVOIDING AND DEFENDING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 12 (1995);
MINTZ, supra note 124, at 60-89. For a thorough history of enforcement of environmental
criminal laws, see Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersec-
tion of Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TULANE L. REV. 487 (1997).
128. See Cooney et al., supra note 126, at 10,474. The agencies prosecute individuals as
well as corporations for violations of environmental laws. Id. at 10,469.
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number of individual violators have been convicted and have served prison
time 29 for knowingly violating environmental laws. 3 ' When an agency
receives information that a corporation has violated an environmental law or
regulation the agency generally seeks to identify and prosecute the highest
ranking official in the corporation responsible for the violation, seeking
imprisonment as well as fines.' "Incarceration is the one cost of business
that you can't pass on to the consumer.' 
32
[T]here is a renewed focus on prosecution of individual corporate officials who can
be prosecuted not only for acts in which they personally participated but as respon-
sible corporate officers who could have prevented environmental harm but did not
do so. The Department is committed to imposing meaningful criminal liability on
both corporations and individual corporate officers in appropriate cases.
Van Cleve, supra note 81, at 409.
129. See Cooney et al., supra note 126, at 10,462.
From ... October 1982 until April 7, 1995, Justice obtained indictments against
443 corporations and 1,068 individuals. During that time, 334 organizations were
convicted by plea or verdict. Justice recovered $297 million in criminal penalties,
$125 million of which was obtained from the Exxon Valdez oil spill alone. Sen-
tences totalling 561 years of imprisonment (not counting actual time served) were
imposed against those convicted.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Judson W. Starr, Prosecuting Pollution, LEGAL TII vES, May 31,
1993, at 6.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 962 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding
sentence of concurrent terms of three years and three and one-half years for knowingly dispos-
ing of hazardous waste without permit and knowingly failing to report release of hazardous
substance); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1984)
(concluding that courts may hold employees criminally liable for illegal disposal made at
direction of company); Government Defense Contractor Guilty of"Knowing Endangerment"
Under Water Act, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 21, 21 (May 23, 1990) (discussing case in which
court convicted president of company of"knowing endangerment" for illegal dumping of nitric
acid and nickel plating waste in public sewer system); Cocaine Charge Fails to Materialize;
Justice Gets Hazardous Waste Conviction, 2 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1399, 1399 (April 13,1988)
(discussing case in which court convicted defendant of knowing endangerment and knowing
transport of hazardous waste to unlicensed facility for disposal in residential area).
131. See Cooney et al., supra note 126, at 10,469 (noting Jistice Department's unpub-
lished policy); see also United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1414 (10th Cir. 1991)
(upholding 18 count conviction of director ofutility company who submitted false information);
United States v. Gordon Stafford, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 337, 337 (N.D. W. Va. 1997) (finding
president of company personally liable for improper waste disposal).
132. DOJ, EPA Enforcement Officials Outline Plans toBolsterActionsAgainst Corporate
Polluters, [May 1989- April 1990 File Binder] 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 52, at 2012 (Apr. 27,
1990) (quoting Joseph G. Block, ChiefofEnvironmental Crimes Unit offDepartment ofJustice).
Commentators in other areas such as antitrust have made the point that incarceration provides
a strong deterrent by preventing penalty-shifting. See Amanda Kay Esquibel, Note, Protecting
Competition: The Role of Compensation andDeterrencefor ImprovedAntitrust Enforcement,
41 FLA. L. REv. 153, 172, 174 (1989).
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C. Implications of Statutory Law for Attorney Confidentiality
Many states have imposed disclosure requirements on owners who trans-
fer residential' or commercial property."' 4 Generally, environmental statutes
create a duty only on the owner or operator ofa site.35 Although some federal
environmental statutes impose criminal liability for the knowing endanger-
ment of another,136 whether these would apply to attorneys is a difficult
question. This question is even more difficult, of course, when an attorney
must analyze and answer it in urgent circumstances such as those posed by the
introductory hypothetical. Some environmental statutes place responsibility
for reporting a dangerous environmental condition on "any person" having
knowledge of the condition.3 7 Such statutes are rare and appear to be predi-
cated on a determination that the hazardous condition is so dangerous that any
person should have an obligation to report it to environmental authorities.
When such a statute applies to a case, an interpretive question may arise as to
whether the legislature intended to include attorneys within the group of
persons having an obligation to report the dangers.' In other contexts,
133. See Katherine A. Pancak et al., Residential Disclosure Laws: The Further Demise
of Caveat Emptor, 24 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 299-303 (1996) (table); see also Idaho Property
Condition Disclosure Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 55-2501 to -2518 (1994).
134. See Ram Sundar & Bea Grossman, The Importance ofDue Diligence in Commercial
Transactions: Avoiding CERCLA Liability, 7 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 351, 357, 382 (1996).
135. For example, the Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act, TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 68-215-101 to -128 (1996), creates penalties for anyone who endangers the public by
a release of petroleum. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-215-120 (1996). The act contemplates
monitoring and reporting of dangerous environmental conditions by the owner or operator of
a petroleum tanks. See id. § 68-215-104. Congress requires "owners and operators" of"station-
ary sources" that produce, process, handle or store listed chemicals "to identify hazards which
may result from such releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques" and then to
prevent releases and to minimize the consequences of accidental releases. Clean Air Act
§ 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1) (1994).
136. See Clean Water Act § 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1994); SWDA § 3008(e),
42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1994); SWDA § 11005(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6992d (c).
137. The New York Petroleum Bulk Storage Act requires that "any person with knowledge
of a spill, leak, or discharge of Petroleum" report the condition to the Department of Environ-
mental Conservation within two hours of learning of the condition. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 6, § 613.8 (1995) The New Jersey Underground Storage Tank Act has similar
provisions. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58: IOA-21 to -37 (West 1992). TheNew Jersey Administra-
tive Code, which implements the Act, provides that "any person including but not limited to the
owner or operator of an underground storage tank system" shall report the release after
confirming its existence to the local health agency. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 14B-7.3(a)
(1990) (emphasis added); see also Harriett Jane Olson & Kathleen T. Kneis, ReportingReleases
From Clients' Underground Storage Tank Systems: Should Attorneys Have the Hot Line on
Speed Dial?, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 1041, 1042 (1991).
138. Similarly, SEC Rule lOb-5 provides in part that:
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scholars have argued that the duty of confidentiality should operate to exempt
the attorney from reporting requirements that would require disclosure of
client confidences. 39 As with other issues of statutory interpretation, how-
ever, the full context of the legislation 40 should be considered in interpreting
the intent of the legislature. A court or administrative agency, such as the
EPA, may also require disclosure in order to reveal information. 4'
Model Rule 1.6 does not consider the dangers of silence relating to
potential environmental hazards or other dangers. Its refusal to acknowledge
positive law and its outcome-based analysis fail to provide guidance to attor-
neys in balancing their legal and ethical responsibilities. By allowing silence
in the face of danger, the Rule minimizes the importance of dangers clients
may create. Environmental hazards dramatize the competing interest of public
safety. Congress, state legislatures, and the courts recognize the danger of
these hazards. The rules of attorney ethics should not ignore them.
[i]t shall be unlawful for anyperson, directly or indirectly...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). Courts have held attorneys liable for violating this provision.
See infra notes 253-54.
139. See J. Randolph Evans & Ida Patterson Dorvee, Attorney Liability For Assisting
Clients with Wrongful Conduct: Established and Emerging Bases ofLiability, 45 S.C. L. REV.
803,805 (1994) (arguing thatrequiring attorneysto reveal securities frauds would destroy client
trust in attorneys); Mosteller, supra note 79, at 211 (arguing that laws requiring reports of child
abuse should not apply to attorneys because "[t]he minimal benefits to the cause of protecting
children is outweighed by the damage to doctrines historically important in protecting individ-
ual autonomy, particularly by the dangers inherent in approving threatened criminal sanctions
as a means of transforming lawyers into mandatory reporters of crime"). Whatever one may
conclude on these difficult questions, the calculus changes somewhat when the competing
interest at stake is prevention of a catastrophe on the scale of the Bhopal disaster.
140. For statutes on reporting requirements or other disclosure requirement, the analysis
turns on the reason for the requirement.
141. The Clean Air Act provides penalties of up to $25,000 per day against "any person"
who knowingly fails to comply with an order of the Administrator of EPA. See Clean Air Act
§ I 13(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(1) (1994). It also provides for penalties of $10,000 against
any person making a false statement or report. See Clean Air Act § 113(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(b)(2). Similarly, CERCLA and the Clear Water Act provide penalties for failure to
report discharges in some circumstances. See CERCLA § 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1994);
Clean Water Act § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
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V The Common Law andAttorney Liability
In addition to the broad liability imposed by federal and state environ-
mental statutes, 142 the common law imposes less-defined liability for environ-
mental harms.143 Unlike statutory duties, common-law duties accrue without
clear notice or advance warning, growing out of general concepts of rights and
obligations.1" Generally, the major federal environmental statutes do not
abrogate common-law actions.1 45 Thus, one who suffers harm as a result of
environmental hazards may have recourse via common law actions.'46
142. See supra notes 83-113. CERCLA liability may survive corporate dissolution. See
Joel R. Burcat and Craig P. Wilson, Post-Dissolution Liability of Corporations and Their
Shareholders Under CERCLA, 50 BUS. LAW. 1273, 1285-92 (1995) (discussing cases that apply
"dead and buried" rule to allow CERCLA suits against dissolved corporations). But see City
of'North Miami, Fla. v. Berger, 828 F. Supp. 401, 411-12 (E.D. Va. 1993) (finding attorney not
liable under CERCLA as "operator" despite fact that he held 15% ownership interest in
corporation and was corporate secretary because he merely provided legal advice to corporation
rather than exercising decision-making authority over or actual control of operations).
143. For example, in Houchens v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., ajury ordered Rockwell to pay $8
million in actual damages and $210 million in punitive damages for polluting the Mud River
with polychlorinated biphenyls. See Houchens v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No.93-CI-00158 (Ky.
Cir. Ct. May 31, 1996), discussed in Riparian Owners Awarded $218 Million in Kentucky
Pollution Suit Against Rockwell, 11 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 14, 14-15 (June 5, 1996). The court
rendered the verdict in spite of an absence of proof on emotional damages. See Riparian
Owners Awarded $218 Million in Kentucky Pollution SuitAgainst Rockwell, 11 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 14, 14 (June 5, 1996); see also PG&E to Pay $333 Million to Settle Lawsuit over Envir-
onmental Exposures, 11 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 173, 173-74 (July 10, 1996) (discussing case
in which 650 plaintiffs alleged health problems due to chromium exposure from natural gas).
144. See RAY L. PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHIcs: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
§ 3.02, at 12 (2d ed. 1984). "[G]iven the nature of the common law system, the lawyer cannot
be sure when the courts will treat the breach of an ethical duty as the breach of a legal duty."
Id.; see also Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 938 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that jury issue
existed regarding whether attorneys committed malpractice in failing to advise plaintiffs fully);
Gomez v. Hawkins Concrete Constr. Co., 623 F. Supp. 194, 198-200 (N.D. Fla. 1985) (con-
cluding that attorney is liable to client for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence for failing
to make full disclosure regarding company receiving loan from client when attorney had finan-
cial interest in borrower).
145. See Jan Erik Hasselman, Comment, Alaska 's Nuisance Statute Revisited: Federal Sub-
stantive Due Process Limits to Common Law Abrogation, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 347,352
(1997) (noting that federal environmental statutes contemplate common law private actions as
"necessary complement to environmental regulations"). An example of the exception exists in
FIFRA, which preempts common law claims relating to labeling of pesticides. See FIFRA
§ 24(b), 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1994); see also MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1029
(5th Cir. 1994); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744,746-48 (4th Cir. 1993); King v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 996 F.2d 1346, 1349 (1st Cir. 1993); Shaw v. Dow Brands,
Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 520 (1 1th Cir.
1993); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179
(10th Cir. 1993).
146. See Davis v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 671 N.E.2d 1049, 1056 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
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The fundamental "gravitational force"'47 of tort law appears to move
toward expanded liability.'48 Although scholars have noted recent trends
favorable to defendants in tort law generally,149 the danger of malpractice
actions against attorneys has increased in recent years. 5 Furthermore,
caution counsels against relying too heavily on trends or patterns in decisions
when assessing the risk of personal liability.' Sound assessment of the risk
of liability rests more on heeding examples set by precedent than on noting
general patterns in judicial decisions. After all, mixed results can be expected
in future cases. 52 A consequent increase in the risk of legal malpractice
(concluding that fact that plaintiff had no right to bring action under Ohio Underground Storage
Tank Act did not preclude common law action for petroleum contamination); see also Appeals
Court Allows Common-Law Recovery for UST Contamination at Former Gas Station, 10
TOxIcsL. REP. (BNA) 1032, 1032 (Feb. 14,1996); Tom Kuhnle, Note, The Rebirth of Common
Law Actionsfor RedressingHazardous Waste Contamination, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187,210-
14 (1996); Randall G. Vickery & Robert M. Baratta, Jr., Back to the Legal Future: Environ-
mental Claims Come Full Circle as Plaintiffs Return to the Common Lawfor Relief, NAT'L L.J.,
June 10, 1996, at Cl.
147. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 112-13 (1978).
148. Law professors analogize the expansion of legal concepts to new contexts by the
phenomenon of the camel's nose. It is said that on cold nights in the desert if the camel can get
his nose under the tent he can get his entire body under the tent. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, The
Complexity& Legitimacy ofCorporate Law, 50 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 1565, 1612 (1993) (argu-
ing that neither "[flear of slippery slopes or camel's noses in tents" should deter lawmakers from
moving "corporate law toward more just results"); Ellyn S. Rosen, Keeping the Camel's Nose
Out of the Tent: The Constitutionality of N.L.R.B. Jurisdiction Over Employees of Religious
Institutions, 64 IND. L.J. 1015 (1989).
149. See James A. Henderson, Jr., & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability: An Empirical Study ofLegal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 480 (1990)
(arguing that recent changes have moved "toward placing significant limitations on plaintiffs'
rights to recover in tort for product-related injuries"); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the
Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 603 (1992)
(stating that "expansion of modem tort law has essentially ended").
150. An explosion of law suits were filed against attorneys and other professionals as a
result of the savings and loan scandal. See JAY M. FEINMAN, ECONOMICNEGLIGENCE: LIABIL-
ITYOFPROFESSIONALS ANDBUSINESSESTOTHIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS xxv (1995); see
also Pamela A. Bresnaham, Introductory Letter, to A.B.A.: THE LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY UPDATE (Patricia A. Kom ed., 1995) (on file with author).
[W]hile no comprehensive national data exists, anecdotal evidence indicates that
legal malpractice claims are on the rise. Even good lawyers can expect to be sued at
some point during their careers. In addition, because of more sophisticated clients
and the growing trend in society to "blame" someone for everything, there is potential
for future increases in the number of legal malpractice suits and the amount of
judgments.
Id.
151. The precautionary principle is well-known in environmental law. Application of this
principle may have merit in the context of liability as well as physical safety.
152. See Schwartz, supra note 149 at 603 (noting that future cases "will involve a mix of
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claims has resulted from expansion of the concept of what constitutes legally
cognizable harm and, additionally, from the widening circle of who can be
held responsible for harm. Moreover, attorneys in environmental practice may
be at special risk to the scrutiny of courts. 53
A developing American tradition of suing anyone closely connected to
a dispute is adding to the number of tort actions.. and the variety of theories
asserted. 55 Both in the environmental field and generally, the possibility of
common law liability has created legitimate concern among attorneys about
potential tort liability to nonclients. Indeed, fear of tort liability to nonclients
may be the only significant force - other than possibly the attorney's own
conscience - that supports disclosure of client confidences.
Although Model Rule 1.6 generally prohibits the disclosure of client
information (even to reveal dangers),'56 it is possible that a court may find an
results," and that "the tendency to expand liability has by no means dried up"). Moreover, the
general concept of attorney liability seems to be firmly established in the law. See Collins v.
Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1186 (Il1. 1992) (ruling that complaint against lawyer for profes-
sional malpractice may be couched in either contract or tort).
153. With the potential for great harm comes the additional potential for great liability.
See Ruhl, supra note 7, at 173; James R. Arnold & Gerald J. Buchwald, Superfund = Super-
liability: Are Lawyers the Next Deep Pocket?, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 117 (stating that
"[d]oomsayers predict that the next professional liability crisis may focus on environmental
lawyers as the deep pocket").
154. See Evans & Dorvee, supra note 139, at 823.
For example, the S & L crisis resulted in numerous government actions against
attorneys.
InNovember 1990 approximately fifty legal malpractice actions were pending
against attorneys who had represented failed financial institutions. For the most
p art, the suits had been instigated either by the FDIC or by financial instituitions
which had later been taken over by the federal government At that time, the
RTC announced its intent to pursue approximately 140 additional professional
liability claims against attorneys who had represented failed banks.
Id. (footnote omitted). The authors note that such cases may "represent a significant expansion
of the bases of attorney liability for allegedly assisting their clients with wrongful conduct." 1d.
at 836.
155. See Don J. Benedictus, Hazardous Advice: Lawyer, Firm Prosecuted for Telling
Client Not to Clean Up Waste, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 16 (discussing felony charges filed
against eight people, including some attorneys, on theory that letter abandoning their client's
laboratory constituted illegal disposal of hazardous wastes); see also Evans & Dorvee, supra
note 139, at 827 (noting that in its actions against attorneys who represented failed savings
and loan institutions, government argued that attorneys who represent financial institutions
have fiduciary obligation to governmental regulatory authorities). Additionally, the modem
expansion of legal concepts regarding what conduct constitutes fraud, what harm justifies
compensation, and what interests are worthy of protection can also result in expansion of
liability.
156. Many dangers remain within the textual prohibition of Rule 1.6. The Rule's literal
meaning forbids disclosure except when client conduct is most culpable - a crime - and the
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attorney liable for failing to disclose information in some circumstances.157
The hypothetical situation posed at the beginning of this Article may be such
a situation ifthe courtfinds thatthe environmental contamination creates clear
peril to the nonclient 58 The failure of a seller to reveal environmental
contamination to the purchaser of property may create a basis for liability
for the seller when the condition constitutes a material defect unknown to
the buyer. 59 The question posed by the introductory hypothetical to this
Article is whether the seller's attorney may also be liable to a purchaser
when the attorney knows the purchaser is ignorant of a dangerous condition
and that the seller will not reveal the condition. 60 This Part surveys three
common law developments that enhance the likelihood of attorney liability:
(1) the widening circle of liability, (2) abrogation of the bar of privity, and
consequence of the crime is most severe - imminent death or substantial bodily harm. Addi-
tionally, the comments to the Rule counsel silence without regard to dangers. See supra notes
13-26 and accompanying text.
157. In another highly regulated area, banking and securities, attorneys have paid signifi-
cant settlements to avoid litigating issues of attorney liability for client misconduct. The New
York law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler paid $41 million to settle an action
brought by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in which the OTS alleged that the law firm
knowingly misrepresented information about the failed Lincoln Savings and Loan Association
to federal authorities. See H. Lowell Brown, The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel Faced with
Client Misconduct: Disclosure of Client Confidences or Constructive Discharge, 44 BUFF. L.
REV. 777, 848 (1996) (describing fraud practiced by client in OPM case and resulting settle-
ment by attorneys representing OPM). The Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue law firm settled with
the Resolution Trust Corporation for $51 million as a result of the firm's representation of
Lincoln Savings. See Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L
Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639, 669-70 (1994) (giving
evidence of lack of disciplinary responses to S&L failures and arguing that disciplinary process
is incapacitated as it relates to regulating banking and corporate lawyers). In the environmental
area, strict reporting requirements are set by numerous federal and state environmental statutes.
See CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C. 9603 (1994) (addressing CERCLA reporting requirements).
Environmental attorneys should have concern that they may be liable for failing to report client
violations in this area. See generally Ruhl, supra note 157 (discussing dangers of liability in
current "high-tech world of lawyering").
158. In one case, the EPA charged an attorney as a potentially responsible party under the
CERCLA for advising a client to abandon a contaminated site. See Benedictus, supra note 155,
at 16.
159. The vendor of land who knows that there is a latent defect, such as contamination of
the property, has an "independent reason for producing information" relating to the contamina-
tion. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1,25-26(1978); see also RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 353, 551 (1965).
Additionally, the Model Rules require an attorney to correct misinformation that she had
previously supplied to the court or another party. See MODEL RULES Rule 4.1.
160. See Hazard, supra note 8, at 283-84 (noting that liability of client does not relieve
attorney of possible liability).
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(3) recognition of a professional's duty to warn third parties of dangers
created by a client.
A. The Widening Circle of Liability
Modem law generally has enlarged the concept of culpable conduct. For
example, in some jurisdictions, a negligent or innocent misrepresentation as
well as an intentional representation is now actionable."' Failure to disclose
information can create a basis for liability even though the defendant made no
affirmative representation."6
Expansion of liability is apparent in the area of environmental law. For
example, courts have held that a plaintiff who has been exposed to a carcino-
gen can recover damages for his reasonable fear of cancer (cancerphobia)
although he has not developed the disease.'63 Transactions involving environ-
161. See Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354,1355 (N.J. 1995) (concludingthat, in sale
of real estate requiring percolation tests to determine suitability of soil for septic system,
attorney for seller has duty not to provide misleading information to potential buyers whom
attorney knows, or should know, will rely on information); see also Gary Lawson & Tamara
Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third-Party Liability ofAccountants andAttorneys
for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1309, 1311 (1991); Susan L. Martin, If
Privity Is Dead, Let's Resurrect It: Liability of Professionals to Third Parties for Economic
Injury Caused by Negligent Misrepresentation, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 649, 652-60 (1991); Andrew
C.J. McCandless Kidd, Comment, The Perimeters ofLiabilityfor Negligent Misrepresentation
in Maryland, 48 MD. L. REV. 384, 385-87 (1989).
162. See Binette v. Dyer Library Ass'n, 688 A.2d 898, 904 (Me. 1996); Maine High Court
Says Seller Of Property Had Absolute Duty To Disclose Leaky Tank, 11 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 838, 838-39 (Jan. 10, 1997) (discussing case in which seller of land breached "abso-
lute" statutory duty to inform buyers of 3,000-gallon underground oil storage tank on the
property).
163. See, e.g., Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling that
even though "cancerphobia" might be element in nuisance case under Colorado law, plaintiffs
must produce evidence that fears of disease from contaminated land "are reasonable and have
a sound foundation in medical, scientific or statistical evidence"); Dunn v. Hovic, I F.3d 1362,
1366 (3d Cir. 1993) (upholding jury award to plaintiff based on showing of physical impact of
asbestos on plaintiff's lungs even assuming plaintiff did not contract asbestosis); Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1206 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that cancerphobia is basis
of claims for mental anguish damages based on exposures to certain chemicals); Herber v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that under New Jersey law
plaintiff need only demonstrate "slight impact and injury ... to warrant recovery for emotional
distress caused by fear"); Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319-21 (5th Cir.
1986) (reversing summaryjudgment against plaintiffand recognizing "cancerphobia" with proof
of actual exposure); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 499 (N.J. 1985) (holding
that fear of cancer and cancerphobia are distinct claims); see also Pennsylvania Court OKs
Cancer Fear Award; Ruling Denying Damages Not Retroactive, 11 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA)
1196, 1196-97 (April 2, 1997) (discussing Cleveland v. Johns-Manville Corp., 690 A.2d 1146
(Pa. 1997)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a trial courtjury instruction which stated
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mental risks present significant liability concerns because of the dramatic
dangers posed by environmental hazards and the frequently high cost of
remedying environmental problems."6 Moreover, courts appear particularly
willing to expand the concept of care in the environmental area. 6 Some
courts have found a duty to persons at risk despite the absence of any contrac-
that a plaintiffcould recover damages for fear of cancer based on exposure to asbestos although
he never developed the disease. See Cleveland v. Johns-Manville Corp., 690 A.2d 1146, 1151-
52 (Pa. 1997).
164. See Kathryn A. Watson, USX Case Sets State Enforcement Precedent, 27 LOOKING
AHEAD, July-Aug. 1996, at 3 (noting $106 million settlement between Indiana and USX
Corp.). Courts and commentators often note that CERCLA liability is not only strict liability,
it is also long lasting - virtually unending. See Stychno v. Ohio Edison Co., 806 F.Supp. 663,
676 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (ruling that dissolved corporation may be held liable under CERCLA so
long as corporate assets exist); United States v. Moore, 698 F.Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1988)
(concluding that CERCLA suit may be brought against corporation even after corporate dis-
solution); Ridgway M. Hall, Jr., The Problem of Unending Liability for Hazardous Waste
Management, 38 Bus. LAW. 593, 595 (1983) (noting dangers and liabilities for handling and
disposal of hazardous wastes). Some courts distinguish between corporations that are merely
"dead" and those that are "dead and buried" in order to extend CERCLA liability beyond
dissolution of the corporation. See Idylwoods Assocs. v. Mader Capital, Inc., 915 F. Supp.
1290, 1304 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); AM Properties Corp. v. GTE Products Corp., 844 F. Supp. 1007,
1012 (D.N.J. 1994); Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Hitco, Inc., 762 F. Supp.
1298, 1301 (W.D. Mich. 1991); see also Joel R. Burcat & Craig P. Wilson, Post-Dissolution
Liability of Corporations and Their Shareholders Under CERCLA, 50 Bus. LAW. 1273, 1291
(1995).
165. While judicial trends are difficult to categorize, caution seems appropriate in the
environmental context.
Threejudicial trends make it especially foolhardy to ignore environmental concerns
in business or real estate transactions or practices. First, courts are increasingly
willing to impose direct civil liability for environmental wrongdoing on corporate
officers, directors, shareholders, and parent corporations. Second, judges are less
reluctantto hold successor corporations liable for their predecessors' environmental
sins. A third trend is the willingness of courts to hold lenders, contractors and
sometimes even attorneys personally liable for environmental cleanup costs.
Thomas B. Dominick, Avoid Personal Liability: Consider Environmental Issues in Business
Transactions, 38-SEP Advocate (Idaho) 10 Advocate September, 1995; see also Vitol Trading
S.A., Inc. v. SGS Control Services, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 874 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1989); EvaM. Fromm et al., Allocating Environmental Liabili-
ties inAcquisitions, 22 J. CORP. L. 429,463 (1997) (explaining willingness of courts to "extend
a party's indemnification rights to include protection against environmental liability under
CERCLA, even where the indemnity agreement was entered into years before CERCLA was
enacted"); Lisa A. Jensen, The Risk in Defining Risk: Potential Liability of Environmental
Consultants and Engineers, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1954 (Dec. 4, 1992); Mark E.
McKane, Comment, Operator Liabilityfor Parent Corporations under CERCLA: A Return to
Basics, 91 NW. U. L. REv. 1642, 1656 (1997) (noting willingness of courts to "interpret operator
liability expansively under a capacity to control standard in order to expose parent corporations
to CERCLA liability").
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tual duty. In Caldwell v. Bechtel,'66 for example, a heavy equipment operator
working on a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority construction
project sued Bechtel, alleging that Bechtel's negligence caused his lung
disease." 7 Bechtel had contracted with the Transit Authority to provide
"safety engineering services" on the project.'68 Although Bechtel had no
direct contractual relationship with plaintiff or his employer, the court held
Bechtel liable on the basis that Bechtel had a responsibility to inform plaintiff
about known health risks. The court found that Bechtel had "placed itself in
the position of assuming a duty" to the plaintiff.'69 Although the Bechtel case
did not reach the issue of whether a member of the public could be a "foresee-
able" third-party beneficiary of a consulting relationship, the analysis supports
that idea when the public or an individual citizen injured is a foreseeable
beneficiary of safety engineering services. 70
B. Abrogation of the Bar of Privity
The doctrine of privity protects contracting parties - including profes-
sionals, such as attorneys - from suit by individuals who are not parties to the
contract.' Traditionally, only clients could sue an attorney for damages
resulting from the attorney's malpractice. The bar of privity precluded a
nonclient from suing an attorney for acts or omissions taken in his profes-
sional capacity.'72 By insulating attorneys against malpractice claims of non-
clients, this doctrine not only protected attorneys financially, it also enhanced
the security of the relationship between attorneys and their clients.'73
166. 631 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
167. See Caldwell v. Betchel, 631 F.2d 989, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
168. Id. at 992.
169. Id. at 997.
170. John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness ofStrangers: Some Observations
About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 867, 867 (1991) (concluding that courts should "impose upon defendants an
obligation to act reasonably under the circumstances - the same duty prescribed in any negli-
gence action").
171. There are early examples ofjudicial limits on the doctrine ofprivity. See MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (allowing negligent action by nonparty
who had suffered bodily injury).
172. See Buckley v. Gray, 42 P. 900, 900 (Cal. 1895). The bar did not, however, immu-
nize the attorney from claims of malicious acts, evil intent, or fraudulent purpose. Id. at 901.
173. See National Say. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195,200 (1880) (concluding that attorney
owed no duty of care to non-client buyer of property); First Mun. Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship,
648 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. App. 1983) (concluding that, in absence of privity of contract,
nonclient buyer could not recover against attorneys hired by seller to issue opinion on transac-
tion); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 417 N.E.2d 882, 887 (111. App. 1981) (finding that attorney owed
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Today, in a trend away from the ancient requirement of privity," most
jurisdictions accept the principle that attorneys may be liable to a nonclient -
at least in cases of clear-cut negligence such as negligently drafting a will.175
Courts have also held professionals in other fields liable. 76 Significant schol-
arship explores the abrogation of the bar of privity. 77 Those who deal with
environmental issues or hazards seem to be particularly susceptible to judicial
scrutiny. Developers, real estate brokers and professionals involved with
environmental issues have all incurred liability for environmental hazards.'78
no duty of care to minor children of client he represented in divorce action); see also Clagett
v. Dacy, 420 A.2d 1285, 1287-89 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (ruling thatattorneys are not liable
to high bidders at foreclosure sale for failure to follow required procedures because attorney's
duty of diligence flows only to his direct client or employer); Victor v. Goldman, 344 N.Y.S.2d
672, 673-74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (deciding that privity barred action of beneficiary of will)
aff'd, 351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).
174. See FEiNmAN, supra note 150, at 286; Tom W. Bell, Limits on the Privity and
Assignment ofLegal Malpractice Claims, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (1992).
175. See Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties ofAttorneys to "Non-Clients": Reconcep-
tualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently
Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 659, 695 (1994); Scott Peterson, Extending Legal
Malpractice Liability to Nonclients - The Washington Supreme Court Considers the Privity
Requirement, Bowman v. John Doe Two, 704 P.2d 140 (1985), 61 WASH. L. REv. 761, 765
(1986).
176. See Rozny v. Marmul, 250 N.E.2d 656, 663 (Il. 1969) (finding surveyor liability to
nonclients); see also RONALD E. MALLEN & VICTOR B. LEvIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 79, at
152-54 (2d ed. 1981) ("[T]he vast majority of modem decisions favored expanding privity
beyond the confines of the attorney-client relationship.").
177. Scholars have explored the abrogation ofprivity relating to other professions in depth.
See generally John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating EducationalMalpractice Claims: A Represen-
tational Focus, 67 WASH. L. REv. 349 (1992); Constance Frisby Fain, Architect and Engineer
Liability, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 32 (1995); Anthony Granato, Architect Liability for Injuries to
Workers: Is There a Duty to Design a Building That Is Safe to Construct?, 21 OHo N.U. L.
REV. 403 (1994); John E. McDonald, Common Law Liability ofArchitects and Engineers for
Negligence to Non-contractual Parties, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 9, 1989, at 5; Samuel S.
Paschall, Liability to Non-Clients: The Accountant's Role and Responsibility, 53 Mo. L. REV.
693 (1988); Karen S. Precella, Architect Liability: Should an Architect's Status Create a Duty
To Protect Construction Workers From Job-Site Hazards?, CONsTRUCTION LAW., Aug. 11,
1991, at 11.
178. See Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (finding
realtor liable for failure to discover fact that property sold had been used as landfill); Haberstick
v. Gordon A. Gundaker Real Estate Co., 921 S.W.2d 104, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (finding
developers liable for failure to disclose presence of nearby hazardous waste site); Strawn v.
Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 429 (N.J. 1995) (finding developer liable when it marketed housing
development as "peaceful, bucolic setting with an abundance offresh air and clean lake waters,"
and failed to disclose to buyers of single-family residences that their homes were located within
one-half mile of toxic waste dump); see also In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1118 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding operators of Three Mile Island nuclear power plant liable for violating their duty of
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Thus, modem tort law is beginning to describe limits to the concept that
the role of the professional is "to prefer the interests of the client or patient
over those of individuals generally."'79 To some degree, abrogation ofthe bar
of privity challenges the professional's preference for his client by making
attorneys and other professionals responsible for harm to nonclients.
While the contest between a nonclient and a professional presents diffi-
cult policy issues,' ° courts appear to be increasingly willing to scrutinize the
role and conduct of professionals.' Courts have recognized liability of
professionals to nonclients in a variety of circumstances,12 based on a variety
of approaches and standards.'83 Theories on which courts have held attorneys
care); In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1119, 1128 (3d Cir. 1995) (ruling that punitive damages are available
to plaintiffs injured by Three Mile Island operators' negligence); Gouveiav. Citicorp Person-to-
Person Fin. Ctr., 686 P.2d 262, 266 (N.M. Ct. App.1984) (deciding that seller's broker who
prepared property description for multiple listing service assumes duty to all those who
subsequently rely on broker's characterizations ofproperty by virtue ofrepresentations); Dennis
J. Herman, Legal Specialization or Legal Liability? HoldingAttorneys Accountable for Their
Advice on Environmental Laws, STAN. ENVTL. L.J. Special Issue 243-276 (1995); Lisa A.
Jensen, supra note 165, at 1954.
179. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN
RIGHTS 1, 5 (1975); see also MODEL RULES Rule 4.4 cmt. 1. The comment states:
Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interest of others to
those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disre-
gard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue such rights, but they
include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons.
Id.
180. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444-48 (N.Y. 1931); Glanzer v.
Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276-77 (N.Y. 1922); see also John G. Fleming and Bruce Maximov,
The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (1974);
Martin E. Goldman, "Something There Is That Doesn't Love A Wall": The Needfor a Concep-
tualApproach to ProfessionalResponsibility, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 713,721 (1975); Leonard
E. Gross, Contractual Limitations onAttorneyMalpractice Liability: An Economic Approach,
75 KY. L.J. 793, 796 (1987).
181. See Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third-Party
Liability ofAccountants andAttorneysfor Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1309,
1310 (1991) (noting that "[u]nsympathetic court statements... may reflect a growing shift in
the legal system's perception of the lawyer's professional role" and speculating that "a signifi-
cant expansion of attorney liability may not be far off').
182. See Perreirav. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1215 (Colo. 1989) (holdingthatpsychiatrist has
duty to exercise due care in determining whether involuntarily committed patient presents
unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to others upon release); Safer v. Estate of George T.
Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996) (recognizing physician's duty to warn
those known to be at risk of avoidable harm from genetic risk of cancer), cert. denied, 683 A.2d
1163 (N.J. 1996); Milohnich v. FirstNat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759,761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)
(recognizing that duty of confidentiality is developing into "qualified duty of nondisclosure");
see also Adler, supra note 170, at 869.
183. For instance, in Biakanja v. Irving, the court used a balancing test to determine
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liable to nonclients include application of third party beneficiary analysis,1 84
negligence,'85 fraud,'86 negligent misrepresentation,' 7 and breach of fiduciary
or agency duties,'88 including special duties imposed by statutes.' 9 In some
cases, the abrogation of privity has resulted in liability although the danger
whether a professional should beheld liable for damage to a non-client. See Biakanjav. Irving,
320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (finding notary public liable for preparing will and failing to have
it properly attested). The test included the following factors: (1) the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
(3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered harm; and (4) the policy of preventing
future harm. Id; see Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 164 (Cal. 1969) (applying Biakanja factors
to action against attorney); see also Douglas A. Cifu, Expanding Legal Malpractice to
Nonclient Third Parties -At What Cost?, 23 CoLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 1 (1989) (noting
expansion of attorney liability to nonclients on both contract and tort theories).
184. See Heyer, 449 P.2d at 163; Ogle v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224, 227 (II. 1984); York
v. Stiefel, 458 N.E.2d 488, 492 (IIL 1983); Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618,625,626 (Md.
1983) (allowing actions for negligent injury to third parties under third party beneficiary
theory); see also Martin D. Begleiter, Attorney Malpractice in Estate Planning- You've Got
to Know When to Hold Up, Know When to Fold Up, 38 KAN. L. REV. 193, 279-80 (1990)
(predicting revolution in attorney malpractice will continue and advocating attorneys do "what
is necessary to complete each estate plan competently and effectively"); Mary Elizabeth Phelan,
Unleashing the Limits on Lawyers' Liability? Mieras v. DeBona. Michigan Joins the Main-
stream and Abrogates the Privily Requirement in Attorney-Malpractice Cases Involving
Negligent WillDrafting, 72 U. DET. MERCYL. REV. 327,328 (1995) (noting that because losses
are obvious, "title examination and will drafting are the two most fertile practice areas to
generate third-party claims").
185. See Heyer, 449 P.2d at 163-65 (finding attorney liable for negligently failing to fulfill
testamentary directions of client); Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 276-77 (reasoning that weigher of beans
who certified incorrect weight knew purpose of his certificate was for buyer of beans and, thus,
bean weigher owed duty of care to buyer despite lack ofprivity); Auric v. Continental Cas. Co.,
331 N.W.2d 325, 327 (Wis. 1983) (finding attorney liable to nonclient beneficiary when
attorney failed to have will properly executed).
186. See In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., No. 83-1702-A1-CIV, 1988 WL 28544, at* 12 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 8, 1988) (stating that lack of fiduciary or formal relationship between knowing
participant in fraud and injured party is not barrier to liability).
187. See Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1565-66 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding attorney
liable for negligently misrepresenting to bank that his client's farm equipment was not subject
to prior security interests). See generally Lawson & Mattison, supra note 181.
188. See Stewart v. Sbarro, 362 A.2d 581, 588 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (stating
that attorney has fiduciary duty to nonclients who reasonably rely on attorney's services);
McEvoy v. Helikson, 562 P.2d 540, 543-44 (Or. 1977).
189. For example, Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
requires disclosure of information. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. §78j(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). "The Court does not refute... the
proposition that lawyers who merely assist in drafting offering documents do not commit
securities violations because of any misstatements or omissions in the offering document.
However, further factual development on what the law firms knew and when they knew it is
necessary." Walco Invs., Inc., v. Thenen, 881 F. Supp. 1576, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
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created by a client did not involve a readily identifiable person."'
The effect of abrogation of the bar of privity is broader than situations of
peril. For example, the abrogation allows a nonclient to sue an attorney for
purely financial loss.' 9 ' Courts have granted judgments in favor of plaintiffs
when attorney negligence resulted in economic loss rather than physical
injury. 92 In Collins v. Binkley,'" for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court
held an attorney liable for his failure to prepare a valid warranty deed. 9' The
court found that the attorney knew that the nonclient-plaintiffs "would rely
upon him and that it was his professional responsibility to prepare a valid
warranty deed entitled to registration that would give notice to the world that
plaintiffs were the owners of the described real property." 95 Courts have also
imposed liability on the general principle that the balance of interests of the
third party outweighs the interest of the attorney and client in confidentiality.
In Biakanja v. Irving,'96 the California Supreme Court formulated a policy-
based balancing of factors.'97
Under this policy-based approach, the court balances the following factors
in determining whether to impose a duty on attorneys not in privity with
third parties: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (3) the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury; (5) the moral
190. See generally Susan Lorde Martin, IfPrivity Is Dead, Let's Resurrect It: Liability of
Professionals to ThirdPartiesfor Economic Injury Caused byNegligentMisrepresentation, 28
AM. Bus. L.J. 649 (1991).
191. Numerous cases allow recovery for negligently drafted wills and other financial losses
to third party beneficiaries. See supra notes 184-85. For a comprehensive discussion of
economic loss in this area, see FEINMAN, supra note 150. See also Martin, supra note 190.
192. See Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 110-11
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that attorney who issued opinion letter to lender, stating that
borrower was general partnership, was liable for costs to lender of proving individuals were
general partners); Collins v. Binkley, 750 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tenn. 1988) (concluding that
attorney was liable for failure to prepare valid warranty deed when attorney knew nonclient-
plaintiffs would rely on him to prepare deed that would give notice to world that plaintiffs were
owners of described real property); Stinson v. Brand, 738 S.W.2d 186, 191 (Tenn. 1987)
(finding attorney could be held liable to nonclient vendors for negligence in handling real estate
transfer where secretary failed to advise vendors to record deed of trust).
193. 750 S.W.2d 737 (Tenn. 1988).
194. See Collins v. Binkley, 750 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tenn. 1988).
195. Id.
196. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
197. See Biakanjav. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (awarding damages against notary
public who negligently prepared will); see also Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Cal.
1961) (extending principle to attorney malpractice).
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blame attached to the defendant's conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing
future harn. 98
Application of this balancing test to the introductory hypothetical sug-
gests that the attorney who fails to warn a nonclient of significant environ-
mental contamination may be held liable to a purchaser who is injured by the
contamination. In most land sales, the attorney for the seller owes no duty to
the third party purchaser because the transaction is at arms-length. 99 Never-
theless, the nonclient-purchaser may prevail against the attorney if he con-
vinces the court of the following points: (1) the transaction was intended to
affect the purchaser; 200 (2) the attorney knew or should have foreseen the
risks to the farmer from the hazardous contamination;20' (3) the contamina-
tion diminished the value of the property or created health risks for plaintiff;2 2
(4) the attorney's conduct (silence) caused the injury;2 3 (5) the defendant-
attorney participated in the transfer knowing that plaintiff's use or habitation
198. Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 622 (Md. 1985) (summarizing balancing
approach developed by California and holding that negligent misrepresentation and negligence
claims are available only to party in privity with defendant, not to third party beneficiary).
199. See Fox v. Pollack, 181 Cal. App. 3d 954, 961 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In Easton v.
Strassburger, the California court held a real estate broker liable for failing to discover and
disclose the fact that the house sold was constructed on a landfill. Easton v. Strassburger, 152
Cal. App. 3d 90, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). Subsidence in the landfill soil caused settling of the
foundation ofthe house. Id. at 96; cf. Heliotis v. Schuman, 181 Cal. App. 3d 646, 650-52 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (ruling that attorney had no obligation to inform buyer that soil under house was
unstable). The unstable soil caused a portion of the property to fall away suddenly. Id. at 649.
200. Although the primary intent of vendor and vendor's attorney is to rid vendor of an
undesirable property, a part of the intent is to transfer the property to purchaser.
201. In this hypothetical setting of contaminated property, the defendant should foresee
harm to the plaintiff. Circumstances may indicate that third parties are relying on statements
by a seller's attorney negotiating with those third parties. See Bohn v. Cody, 832 P.2d 71, 76
(Wash. 1992) (concluding that it was "certainly foreseeable" that plaintiff would rely on
attorney's statements and recognizing attorney liability to nonclients based on either negligence
or multi-factor balancing test).
202. Certainly the land acquired is worth less than it would be in an uncontaminated state.
The effects on a dairy farmer who unknowingly purchases contaminated land could include the
loss of business, the loss of his cattle, and endangerment of the farmer and his family if they live
on the farm. The effect may also include danger to the public, if it is likely consumers will be
exposed to hazardous chemicals from consumption of the milk produced on the farm. That
problem raises considerations dealt with in Part IV of this article.
203. A court could find this element if plaintiff establishes that it is more likely than not
that the contamination was the cause of his injuries. Depending on the type of contamination,
the effect could present a known danger to the purchaser's life and that of his family as well as
to his livelihood. In Norman v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, the court held that an attorney has the
duty to any person who may foreseeably rely on a tax opinion letter. Norman v. Brown, Todd
& Heybum, 693 F. Supp. 1259, 1265 (D. Mass. 1988). The court noted that the attorney should
know that such letters would be distributed to third parties. Id.
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would place the plaintiff at risk of significant health effects;2. and (6) a
judgment against the attorney would prevent future harm by deterring attorney
involvement in such transfers.
Other views of privity"0 5 and bases for professional liability are develop-
ing. For example, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 552 would support
imposition of liability against an attorney in some cases.206 Section 552
recognizes a professional's duty to supply accurate information. It endorses
liability for negligently supplied information and for breach of a duty to
provide information.2 7 The section speaks to one who "supplies false infor-
mation for the guidance of others" if he "fails to exercise reasonable care" in
"communicating the information.""2 8
204. If evidence reveals that the contamination includes a chemical that is a carcinogen,
a court is more likely to extend the duty of care in the interest of public policy.
205. For example, Kentucky has rejected the privity doctrine entirely. See Sparks v. Craft,
75 F.3d 257, 261 (6th Cir. 1996) (declaring that "there is no privity requirement for legal
malpractice actions in Kentucky"); see also Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978).
206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976). Section 552 provides as
follows:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if
he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating
the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient
intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends
to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created,
in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
Id.
207. See id.; Tartera v. Palumbo, 453 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tenn. 1970) (finding surveyor
liable to nonclient for negligence); Cook Consultants, Inc. v. Larson, 700 S.W.2d 231, 234
(Tex. App. 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding surveyor liable to third party); see also Blue Bell,
Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Tex. App. 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.)
(doubting "the wisdom of continuing to apply different standards for determining the liability
of different professionals to third parties").
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 552 (1976). InStinsonv. Brand, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that attorneys who failed to fully advise a nonclient could be liable for the
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At its heart, the issue of attorney liability presents a public policy judg-
ment20 9 based on the facts of each case.210 The analysis of courts abrogating
privity often focuses on the potential injury to the public if the conduct alleged
were to go unchecked. For example, inAuric v. Continental Casualty Co.,211
the court allowed a nonclient beneficiary to recover against an attorney who
negligently drafted a will, noting that the public interest is served by the
decision.212 Arguably, the public interest is at least as strong in cases involv-
ing environmental hazards. In the hypothetical sale of contaminated property,
the danger to the nonclient involves the potential for physical injury rather
than merely the risk of financial loss. In order to prevent similar occurrences
in the future, courts could require disclosure even in the absence of knowledge
of intended use.213
C. Recognition of a Professional's Duty to Warn
Judicial recognition of a duty to warn others of dangers also enhances the
risk of attorney liability.214 Courts and commentators often cite the well-
nonclient's losses. See Stinson v. Brand, 738 S.W.2d 186, 190-91 (Tenn. 1987). In Stinson,
a purchaser hired attorneys to draw up the closing documents for a real estate transaction. Id.
at 188. The sellers were not experienced in real estate transactions and were not represented
by counsel. Id. at 187. The attorneys failed to advise sellers to record the deed of trust, leaving
sellers without recourse when the purchaser resold the property and filed bankruptcy. Id. at
188-89. Noting that the entire transaction was inexpertly handled and, further, that the princi-
ples of Section 552 "could apply to attorneys as well as to land surveyors, accountants, or title
companies," the court concluded that ajury could find that the attorneys breached a duty to the
vendors despite the lack of privity. Id. at 190, 191.
209. See Krawczykv. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733,735 (Conn. 1988) (noting that"[d]etermining
when attorneys should be held liable to parties with whom they are not in privity is a question
of public policy"); see also Maryland Cas. Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1916)
(applying tripartite test under which plaintiffmust prove (1) attorney's employment; (2) neglect
of reasonable duty; and (3) loss to client that was proximately caused by attorney's neglect).
210. See Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1043 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
211. 331 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1983).
212. See Auric v. Continental Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Wis. 1983) (allowing will
beneficiary to maintain suit against negligent attorney despite absence of privity).
213. See also W. Probert&R. Hendricks, LawyerMalpractice: DutyRelationshipsBeyond
Contract, 55 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 708, 721 (1980).
214. Growing recognition of a duty to rescue in some circumstances is another dramatic
expansion. In one article, Professor A.D. Woozley argues that the law should proscribe as a
criminal offense the failure to assist persons in physical danger. See generally A.D. Woozley,
A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. RaV. 1273 (1983); Saul
Levmore, Waitingfor Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law
of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986) (exploring themes underlying
omission/commission distinction in tort law and concluding that obligation on part of persons
situated to effect easy rescue will continue to develop).
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known"' case of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California16 as the
watershed decision recognizing the professional's duty to warn a nonclient of
danger.2"7 In Tarasoff, the parents of a murder victim sued a psychologist, Dr.
Lawrence Moore, and others21 for failing to warn their daughter, Tatiana
Tarasoff, of a patient's stated intention to kill her.219 The patient, Prosenjit
Poddar, murdered Tarasoff a short time after he confided his intention to Dr.
Moore.2 ° Although psychiatrists, like attorneys, are bound by a duty of
confidentiality to their clients," the California Supreme Court held that the
plaintiffs stated a cause of action by showing a psychologist's "failure to warn
Tatiana or others likely to apprise her of the danger."'  The court allowed the
victim's parents to amend their complaint to allege that the therapist breached
the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect Tarasoff by failing to warn her
of the danger posed by Poddar. "When a therapist determines, or pursuant
to the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient presents
a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reason-
able care to protect the intended victim against such danger."'
215. See Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 97 (1994) (calling
Tarasoff one of"most celebrated cases in the recent history of American tort law" and linking
Tarasoffto "the growth and consolidation of the paradigm of reasonableness" in modem law).
216. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
217. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346-47 (Cal. 1976)
(concluding that health care professionals have duty to warn nonclient of threats of violence
made by patient); see also People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1974) (involving criminal
prosecution of patient in Tarasoff, Prosenjit Poddar); Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality andthe
"Dangerous"Patient: Implications ofTarasofffor Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORYL.J.
263,290 (1982) (noting that Poddar went free after his conviction was reversed on appeal based
on error in jury instructions).
218. Defendants also included the University of California, police officers, psychiatrists
at Cowell Memorial Hospital, and the head of the department of psychiatry at the University of
California. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339-40. The court held that plaintifffailed to state a claim
against the police officers. Id. at 352-53.
219. Seeid. at341.
220. See id. at 339; see also Poddar, 518 P.2d at 344-45.
221. All 50 states respect the confidential nature of psychotherapy by recognizing an
evidentiary privilege for communications between patients and psychotherapists. See Justices
ConsiderPros and Cons ofPsychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 64 U.S.L.W. 1136, 1136 (March
12, 1996); Privileges: Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 64 U.S.L.W. 3602,3603 (March 12,
1996); see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928-29 (1996).
222. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340, 342. As a public employee, Dr. Moore was protected from
liability for the failure to confine Poddar. Id. at 351-52.
223. See id. at 340-342.
224. Id.at341.
MODEL RULE 1.6 AND POSITIVE LAW
While recognizing an important public policy in the privacy of mental
health patients,' the California Supreme Court held that the duty ofconfiden-
tiality must give way to the duty to warn in the circumstances of danger such
as those presented in the case. 6 "We conclude that the public policy favoring
protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communica-
tions must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger
to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins." 27 The
Tarasoff court did not discuss the issue of privity. Rather, it focused on the
theory of duty to Warn a stranger, a duty which naturally erodes the privity
requirement. While the Tarasoffcourt noted the special relationship between
a therapist and patient,"2 it also noted that the benefits of the confidential
communications must be weighed against "the public interest in safety from
violent assault," 9 indicating that a duty to speak can arise from circumstances
as well as from some pre-existing relationship."
The case of Durflinger v. Artiles'' recognized the duty of physicians to
guard against their patients' dangerous mental conditions in circumstances
less definite than those of the Tarasoff case. 2  Bradley Durflinger was
released from the Lamed State Hospital in April 1974. Shortly after his dis-
225. See id. at 346. The United States Supreme Court recently noted the strong public
interest in confidentiality of information revealed to mental health professionals. See Jaffee,
116 S. Ct. at 1928-29 (discussing confidentiality in context of psychotherapist privilege). The
Court specifically noted that it did not address the scope of the privilege and made no sugges-
tion that the privilege should prevent liability imposed in the Tarasoff case. Id. at 1932.
"Because this is the first case in which this Court has recognized a psychotherapist privilege,
it is neither necessary nor feasible to delineate its full contours in a way that 'would govern all
conceivable future questions in this area."' Id. (citation omitted).
226. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347; see also Sherrie A. Wolfe, Note, The Scope of a
Psychiatrist's Duty to Third Persons: The Protective Privilege Ends Where the Public Peril
Begins, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1984).
227. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347. It should be noted that the peril at issue in this case was
not "public peril" in the sense of dangers to the public at large. The "public" aspect of the peril
came from the cumulative interest of all persons in receiving the benefit of a warning in such
circumstances.
228. See id. at 343.
229. Id. at 346.
230. See id. at 343 (noting that because of facts of Tarasoff, court "need not here decide
whether foreseeability alone is sufficient to create a duty to exercise reasonably care to protect
a potential victim of another's conduct"); see also Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407, 416
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding mental hospital's failure to inform court ofpatient's mental condition
with greater detail amounted to negligence and such negligence was proximate cause of death
of wife of mental patient at hands of the patient).
231. 563 F. Supp. 322 (D. Kan. 1981).
232. See Durflinger v. Artiles, 563 F. Supp. 322, 332-33 (D. Kan. 1981), affid, 727 F.2d
888 (10th Cir. 1984).
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charge, he murdered his mother and one brother. Irvin Durflinger, Bradley's
father, brought a wrongful death action against five physicians who partici-
pated in the decision to discharge his son from custody. Unlike the facts in
Tarasoff, Bradley had articulated no definite intent to kill particular people.
One physician admitted that he regarded the patient as dangerous. The court
ruled that the physicians failed to exercise reasonable care in determining
whether the patient should be discharged. 3
No reported case has held an attorney liable to a third party in circum-
stances like those of Tarasoffor Durflinger. In recent cases, however, courts
have begun to grapple with the difficult issue of the attorney's duty to warn
third parties.
In Hawkins v. King County, 4 Hawkins sued his attorney, claiming dam-
ages for injuries he received when he "attempted suicide by jumping off a
bridge" after assaulting his mother." 5 The Court of Appeals of Washington
found that the attorney-defendant had no duty to warn the client's mother or
sister in the circumstances presented by the case.26 The court noted that the
mother and sister knew the client had been released from custody and that he
might be dangerous. 7 The mother "was already fully cognizant" of her son's
dangerous nature.23 The court also noted that the attorney had received no
information of a planned assault by the client. 9 In denying liability against
the attorney in Hawkins, the court nonetheless recognized an attorney's
common law duty to warn third parties.2 "The difficulty lies in framing a
rule that will balance properly 'the public interest in safety from violent
attack' against the public interest in securing proper resolution of legal
disputes without compromising a defendant's right to a loyal and zealous
defense."24' The court enunciated the common-law duty of attorneys.
We are persuaded by the position advanced by amicus "that the obligation
to warn, when confidentiality would be compromised to the client's detri-
ment, must be permissive at most, unless it appears beyond a reasonable
doubt that the client has formed a firm intention to inflict serious personal
injuries on an unknowing third person. 242.
233. See Durflinger, 563 F. Supp. at 332-35.
234. 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
235. See Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361, 363, 365 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
236. See id. at 365.
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 365-66.
240. See id.; see also Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 957, 960-61
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (acknowledging attorney's duty to speak regarding tax opinion letter), affd,
729 F.2d 1443 (2d Cir. 1983).
241. Hawkins, 602 P.2d at 365.
242. Id.
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In this statement, the court stated the duty in a manner that enlarges its scope
beyond that of the exception stated in Model Rule 1.6. The court described
the context as one in which "confidentiality would be compromised to the
client's detriment,"243 framing the issue of confidentiality more narrowly than
the broad scope of client protection established by Rule 1.6. By accepting the
test advanced by the amicus, the court adopted a general principle ofconfiden-
tiality and an exception to the general rule created by the "unless" clause. The
court stated that the obligation to warn "must be permissive" except when "the
client has formed a firm intention to inflict serious personal injuries on an
unknowing third person."2" The plain implication is that when the stated
elements are present (i.e., the client clearly has formed a firm intent to inflict
serious harm on another), the step of warning a third party is not permissive,
but is, rather, an obligation. Additionally, the court limited the scope of the
"common law duty to volunteer information" to situations where counsel is
convinced that "his client intends to commit a crime or inflict injury upon
unknowing third persons.""24 Use of the disjunctive "or" in this statement
indicates that the danger of injury to the third party is sufficient to establish
the duty to warn without the element of criminal conduct.246
In State v. Hansen,247 the Supreme Court of Washington held that an
attorney had a duty to reveal threats of harm relating to a judge even though
the defendant made the threat while attempting to retain the attorney as
counsel.24 A Washington statute makes it a crime to intimidate or threaten
a judge because of a ruling or decision.249 The court held that attorneys, as
officers of the court, have a duty to warn members of the judiciary of real
threats to their safety." Although the court held that no attorney-client
relationship was created during the phone conversation in which the defendant
uttered threats against the judge and others, it reasoned, arguendo, that if an
attorney-client relationship existed, the client's remarks would not be pro-
tected because they related to a future crime.5 The court couched its holding
in terms of the attorney-client privilege, but it relied on the language of Model
Rule 1.6 to hold that "[a] lawyer may reveal ... confidences or secrets to the
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id at 366.
246. Arguably, the standard set by the Washington Supreme Court cures the problem
created by the requirement in Rule 1.6 that the threatened conduct constitute a crime. Rather
than limiting the cognizable interests to those protected by. criminal sanctions, it allows
disclosure when the danger of harm outweighs the client's interest in confidentiality.
247. 862 P.2d 117 (Wash. 1993).
248. See State v. Hansen, 862 P.2d 117, 118-19 (Wash. 1993).
249. See id. at 122.
250. See id. at 121-22.
251. See id.
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extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... [t]o prevent the client
from committing a crime." 2
Additionally, some cases have imposed liability on attorneys under
securities statutes. 3 In these cases, the attorney's conduct often has become
so entangled with the client's wrongdoing that liability is imposed on the basis
that the attorney joined the client's scheme as a fraud-feasor." Moreover, the
duty of confidentiality does not protect attorneys from liability based on mis-
representation.
D. Implications of Common Law Doctrines for Attorney Confidentiality
The scope of the attorney's duty to warn is uncertain. Courts seem
reluctant to impose liability on attorneys as a general matter and particularly
reluctant to favor a nonclient who makes a claim against an attorney."
252. Id. at 122; see also Marin v. United States, 814 F. Supp. 1468, 1485-86 (E.D. Wash.
1992) (finding that government agents had duty to warn known victim that she was target of
informant whom they released from custody). ButseeBrooksv. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 197 (Wyo.
1990) (finding attorney not liable to prospective lessors of ranch for damages arising out of lease
because of nonclient status of plaintiffs and failure to allege specific misrepresentations by
attorney).
253. See Ruhl, supra note 157, at 207-08; see also In re American Continental Corp./
Lincoln Say. & Loan See. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992) (denying motion for
summary judgment on basis that evidence raises question of whether attorney violated rule
10(b) by tacitly consenting to removal of harmful document from corporate client files); In re
Rospatch Securities Litigation, 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (recognizing fraud
claim against the law firm because a "senior law partner's participation in misrepresentations
and omissions may be imputed to the law firm."); Securities & Exchange Commission v. The
Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1988) (attorney violated Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
Securities & Exchange Commission Rule lob-5 when he participated in scheme to extend
offering beyond the period specified in the prospectus and to inflate the number of shares
allegedly sold by obtaining short term loans).
254. See Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P., Inc., 104 F.3d 1478 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding attorney
liable for damages for drafting misleading documents and giving appearance of due diligence of
law firm contrary to fact); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.,& SusANP. KONIAKTHELAwANDETHICs
OF LAWYERING 266-69 (1990); John Riley, A Tainted Bond? Lincoln S&L Law Firm Accused
of Helping Its Client Fleece Public, NEWSDAY, Mar. 11, 1990, at 68 (quoting William Black,
Office of Thrift Supervision lawyer, stating that attorneys "prostitute[d] themselves for these
thrifts" by structuring "sham deals" and providing "legal opinions that regulations really were
no barrier to whatever the fraudulent insiders wanted done"); see also Paul M. Barrett, Silent
Partners: When Lawyers See Fraud at a Company What Must They Do, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22,
1997, at Al (noting problem of attorney involvement in client misdeeds and settlements of law
firms in S&L scandal).
255. See, e.g., Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zot & Dunn, 110 F.3d 1247, 1255-56 (6th Cir.
1997) (attorney not liable to creditor for misrepresentation concerning client's finances); Abell
v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1125,1131-33 (5th Cir. 1988) (overturning jury verdict
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Moreover, some jurisdictions have retreated from the general concept of lia-
bility by professionals to nonclients. 6 Although Hawkins and Hansen
recognize an attorney's duty to warn in narrowly defined circumstances,
neither of these cases (nor any other reported case) imposes liability on an
attorney for the failure to warn in circumstances such as Tarasoff or the
hypothetical sale of contaminated property. 7 Only speculation explains the
absence of such a case. Is this absence a result of judicial protectiveness or
empathy for lawyers ("There but for the grace of God... ")? Is it evidence
of a philosophical aversion by judges to liability in this context? Or is it
simply a result of the fact that no case that justifies such liability has been
litigated or decided in a published opinion?
Authority for imposing a duty to warn on professionals seems strongest
in the contexts of mental health professionals 8 and accountants' 9 Some
commentators suggest that, in extreme circumstances, courts may be willing
to impose such a duty on attorneys and other professionals.260 Despite the
against attorney and holding that third party suits for legal malpractice are allowed "only if the
attorney prepares an opinion for the non-client on which he knows the nonclient will rely");
Bowman v. Two, 704 P.2d 140, 143 (Wash. 1985) (noting that attorney may have duty to
nonclient but finding that defendant attorney in this case was not liable to his minor client's
mother despite attorney's failure to follow state procedures relating to alternative residential
placement of child).
256. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 119 (N.Y.
1985) (reaffirming standard set in Ultramares); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174N.E. 441,444-
48 (N.Y. 1931) (holding accountants should be liable to creditors and investors to whom
employer exhibited certificate for reckless misstatement and fraud but not for negligent misstate-
ment unless plaintiff was in privity with accountant or in a relationship approaching privity).
The court required that the accountant must have been aware that the financial reports were to
be used for a particular purpose, and that the accountant must have intended for a known party
to rely on the reports. Id. at 442.
257. In December of 1995, December of 1996, and July of 1997 the following search
requests revealed no reported cases in which an attorney reported a case of environmental
contamination or incurred liability or a sanction for failing to report a hazardous release into the
environment. The searches ran in the ALLFEDS and the ALLSTATEs databases in WESTLAW.
Search request(1): "ATTORNEY! /10FAIL! &REPORT! &HAZARD! &RELEASE!" and "ATTORNEY!
/10 PENAL! & REPORT! & HAZARD! & RELEASE!" Search request (2): "ATTORNEY! LAWYER! /S
REPORT! Is HAzARDous! /2 WASTE! RELEASE!".
258. The Court in Jaffee v. Redmondnoted that psychotherapy serves the public's interest
in addition to the private individual's interest and thus recognized a privilege protecting
confidential communications between a patient and apsychotherapist. See Jaffee v. Redmond,
116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996).
259. See Brumley v. Touche, Ross & Co., 463 N.E.2d 195, 199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
260. See Jeffrey P. Kerrane, Will Tarasoff Liability Be Extended to Attorneys in Light of
New California Evidence Code Section 956.5?, 35 SANTA CLARAL. REv. 825, 830-33 (1995)
(asserting that in creating new exception to attorney-client privileges California legislature
rejected distinction between psychotherapist-patient and attorney-client privilege and thus left
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absence of a reported case imposing liability, it may not be prudent to assume
that attorneys are free of any duty to nonclients as a categorical matter.
Arguments against imposition of such a duty on attorneys are strong.
The duty of the accountant to report client information to the public26 con-
trasts with the general notion that attorneys serve their clients to the exclusion
of all others. Additionally, attorneys do not receive the training or experience
in predicting human behavior that mental health professionals gain in the
normal course of their training and work. Because of their lack of expertise
in this area, attorneys should not be expected to identify with confidence the
mental status of their clients. Whether anyone can make such ajudgment with
complete confidence is open to question, but the point here is that attorneys
should not be judged by the same standard applied to mental health profes-
sionals. Additionally, granting relief to third parties who suffer injury as a
result of the attorney's conduct which is part of the attorney's representation
of a client may diminish the zeal that advocates bring to their role.262 Reason-
ing that attorney liability would dilute the ability of attorneys to provide full
representation, some courts have held attorneys are not liable for injury to
third partes even when it is foreseeable that the nonclients will rely on the
attorney's representation.263
The differences between attorneys and professionals such as mental
health professionals and accountants, while significant, do not necessarily
mean that attorneys have a blanket exemption from the duty to warn. In other
words, the distinctions between attorneys and psychiatrists, while real, may
not justify a categorical exclusion for attorneys from liability in clear-cut
opportunity to impose liability on attorneys); see also John R. Murphy III, Comment, In the
Wake of Tarasoff: Mediation and the Duty to Disclose, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 209, 213-18
(1985) (advocating passage of legislation to protect mediators from forced disclosure of
information obtained during negotiations).
261. See Michael M. Neltner, Comment, GovernmentScapegoating, Duty to Disclose, and
the S&L Crisis: Can Lawyers and Accountants Avoid Liability in the Savings and Loan
Wilderness, 62 U. GIN. L. REv. 655, 680 (1993); Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan,
LawyerDisclosure of Corporate Fraud: EstablishingaFirm Foundation, 50 SMUL.REV. 225,
235 (1996).
262. See Cifu, supra note 183, at 15.
263. See Clagettv. Dacy, 420 A.2d 1285, 1289-90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (providing
that high bidders in foreclosure sale had no action for damages against seller's attorney because
there existed no direct privity nor was bidder "intended to be the beneficiary of the attorney's
undertaking"). To infer that a relationship existed would mean in effect that the attorney
represented both the mortgagee and the bidder, whose interests likely would conflict. See id.;
see also Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 588, 591-92 (Mich. 1981) (finding that physi-
cian who had successfully defended medical malpractice action brought by deceased patient's
family had "no actionable claim on a theory of negligence [against family's attorneys] because
an attorney owes no duty of care to an adverse party in litigation").
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cases of danger to a third party. Moreover, because the common law operates
without clear notice to the person who incurs liability, attorneys should be
cautious." To be sure, a court could apply the principle of liability today
to any attorney who fails to warn a nonclient in circumstances that the
court finds deserving of liability. The psychiatrist in the Tarasoffcase had no
prior judicial or statutory warning of the possibility of liability for a failure to
warn.
Some of the changes in the law noted above are broader than the law of
professional errors or omissions. They seem to be part of a movement in the
law to recognize third party interests in contract and tort law and to take
greater account of the public interest in legal doctrines." 5 In a recent book,
Jay M. Feinman documents a developing pattern of protection of third parties
by courts.266 Feinman's thesis is that courts have granted awards to parties
based on economic injury in a variety of circumstances and on the basis of
varying legal doctrines, and thus, economic negligence should be analyzed
and applied as a separate field of law.267 Cases involving environmental
hazards present a more pronounced need for protection than the ordinary case
of economic negligence. In these cases, physical injury is the risk or cost of
silence. The potential for harm in such cases is dramatic because it involves
the potential for loss of life or other physical injury.26
The analysis of Model Rule 1.6 is driven by the requirement that the
client intends to commit a crime.269 While culpability undoubtedly informs
the analysis of courts in formulating the principles discussed above, it is not
the sole focus or driving force of the inquiry. Courts consider peril to a third
party in deciding whether to hold a defendant liable for failing to warn a third
party of a danger. Although peril may arise from a threatened crime,
264. See supra note 144. Similarly, caution can be found in the way lenders deal with
potential environmental liabilities. For example, it took only one Fleet Factors case to awaken
lenders to the dangers of CERCLA liability. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d
1550, 1557 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (concluding that lender with security interest in facility faces
liability as potentially responsible party under CERCLA if lender had capacity to influence
debtor facility's treatment of hazardous waste).
265. See generally FEINMAN, supra note 150 (noting relational approach to third party
interests across topical areas).
266. See generally id.
267. See id. at 5-8.
268. The interest of the third party can outweigh that of the client. "A number of the cases
in which an attorney is held to owe a duty of reasonable care to the third party to or for whom
it issues a legal opinion rest on the dependence of the third party rather than on the intent of the
attorney and the client." Id. at 325-26.
269. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also Russell, supra note 59, at 425-33.
270. See Green v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 763 F.2d 805, 808-09 (6th Cir. 1985) (ruling
employer must inform employees of perils to which they will be exposed in course of employ-
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negligence may also result in peril.27" ' In Tarasoff, the California Supreme
Court's analysis did not dwell on whether each element of the criminal
offense was clear to the therapist. Speaking to confidentiality of patient-
psychotherapist communication, the court declared that the "protective privi-
lege ends where the public peril begins."272 Similarly, the courts that have
abrogated the bar of privity have not limited liability of attorneys to situations
in which the client has threatened to commit "a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."273
If the Rule seeks to avert significant peril, there seems to be no reason to limit
the operation of the exception to peril that the legislature has foreseen and
proscribed by statute.274
The argument in favor of an imperative of attorney silence is that the
benefits of full representation and counseling compliance with the law justify
the rule even though some people will suffer as a result of the rule. Accept-
ing, arguendo, this view of the transcendent good of confidentiality, additional
questions regarding the ultimate social good arise when situations place this
value in competition with other values of society. In cases of environmental
catastrophe, consideration should be given to the widespread nature of the
harm that could result from attorney allegiance to the principle of confidenti-
ality.2 75 When only one person is imperiled by client conduct, how should this
harm be weighed against the transcendent good of confidentiality? If the harm
is grave and certain, does the transcendent social good require the sacrifice of
the known victim?276 This is the question Tarasoff and other duty to warn
cases address. It is one that courts must decide when such cases arise in the
attorney context.
ment); Jobe v Smith, 764 P.2d 771, 771 (Az. Ct. App. 1988) (finding homeowner had duty to
warn business visitor about possibility of assault from estranged "gentleman friend"); Keck v
American Employment Agency, Inc., 652 S.W.2d 2, 6-7 (Ark. 1983) (concluding that when
psychotherapist determined patient presented serious danger of violence to another, he incurred
obligation to use reasonable care to protect intended victim); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346-47 (Cal. 1976) (concluding that health care professionals had duty to
warn nonclient of threats of violence made by patient).
271. Some environmental statutes criminalize negligent conduct. See Clean Water Act
§ 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1994).
272. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347; see also supra note 200.
273. MoDEL RULES Rule 1.6(b)(1); see also supra Part V.B.
274. Although some environmental statutes criminalize negligent conduct, there is no
reason to believe that Congress intended to curtail the rights of injured parties to sue in tort for
injuries occasioned by violation of environmental statutes.
275. See Russell, supra note 59, at 411-12.
276. Model Rule 1.6 states the test in terms of loss of life, but in future cases the threat may
be a high risk of death, as in exposure to toxic substances.
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Emerging concepts in the law indicate that personal liability is a risk of
practicing law today. Moreover, there exists a genuine risk that nonclient
injuries caused by attorney actions may result in attorney liability. Model
Rule 1.6 ignores this risk of liability and the force of common law and statu-
tory law affecting the obligations of attorneys. The point here is not that
Model Rule 1.6 should be recrafted in order to reduce the likelihood of attor-
ney liability.2' Rather, it is that professional ethics, as an adjunct to positive
law, must accommodate the precepts of positive law (both statutory and
common law).
A basic logical premise of any legal system is that the law must permit
what it requires. In constituting the standards for the professional life of
attorneys, the ABA should be mindful of principles announced by courts as
the arbiters of law. Courts will continue to evaluate the rights and the inter-
ests of individuals that come before them as litigants - despite the pronounce-
ment of the ABA that courts should not reexamine an attorney's decision to
hold client confidences secret.278 Such an evaluation of rights is the primary
role of courts - even when one interest in the balance is the central moral
tradition of attorney confidentiality.
V. The Need for Viable Exceptions to Model Rule 1.6
Model Rule 1.6 creates a disjunction between professional ethics and
duties imposed by positive law. This disjunction exposes third parties to
potential risks and exposes attorneys to potential liability for failing to address
risks to nonclients. The failure of Rule 1.6 is highlighted by the fact that
many states and the American Law Institute incorporate standards that achieve
a more balanced approach to the contest of interests of clients and third
parties.
A. State Modifications to Model Rule 1.6
As with model legislation generally, a strong appeal of the Model Rules
is that all jurisdictions can achieve a uniform and fair approach to standards
for attorney conduct. Uniformity is of particular importance in the area of
confidentiality because the benefits of the rule of confidentiality (early repre-
sentation and full disclosure of information to the attorney by the client)
depend on an informed public.279 Only if the duty is clear and known to
277. Liability is often a strong motivator, encouraging people to refrain from putting others
at risk.
278. "The lawyer's exercise ofdiscretion notto disclose information under Rule 1.6 should
not be subject to reexamination." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 29, at 23.
279. The drafters of Model Rule 1.6 believed that a strong rule of confidentiality is needed
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clients (the general public) will these benefits accrue. Thus, it is essential that
clients understand that they can safely confide in attorneys. Additionally,
there is danger that without uniformity on this important issue the bars will
fragment and lose the benefits of a cohesive sense of community and of
professionalism. 8
The goal of a uniform, understandable rule has not been achieved by the
Model Rule on confidentiality. Empirical data suggest that attorneys as well
as clients lack a clear understanding of the duty of confidentiality.2"' Of the
39 jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Rules, only sixjurisdictions have
retained Model Rule 1.6 in the form endorsed by the ABA.282 A significant
number of states restored the exceptions deleted by the ABA House of Dele-
gates from the Proposed Rule.283 The rejection of Rule 1.6 by the states is
even more dramatic when one considers that uniform rules come to the
jurisdictions with the imprimatur of the ABA and carry an implication that
they will be accepted as written by sister jurisdictions. The fact that so many
jurisdictions departed from the language of the Model Rule is evidence of
dissatisfaction with the formulation of the duty set forth in Model Rule 1.6.2 '
Without exception, the states that modified Rule 1.6 created greater
protection for third parties and the public. Sixteen jurisdictions2 5 include an
to induce clients to seek legal counsel and to share important information with their attorneys.
See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. 2 (noting that duty of confidentiality "not only facilitates the
full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages
people to seek early legal assistance"). Only if the duty is clear and known the general public
will these benefits accrue. See id. at cmt. 3 ("lawyers know that almost all clients follow the
advice given, and the law is upheld").
280. See R.W. Nahstoll, The Lawyer's Allegiance: Priorities Regarding Confidentiality,
41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 421,424-25 (1984).
281. See Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response
to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 102-06 (1994); Zacharias,
supra note 17, at 396.
282. See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); DEL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); Mo. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); R.I.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996) (adding words "but is not obligated" to modify
"may... reveal").
283. See 2 HAZARD &HODES, supra note 12, § AP4:103, at 1261.
284. Dissatisfaction with attorneys has also increased in recent times. Strong public
sentiment against lawyers has grown due in part to a belief that lawyers are preoccupied with
self-interest or the selfish interest of their clients. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 11-13 (1993).
285. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(d)(2)(A) (1997); HAW. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(6) (1997); ILL. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1) (Supp.
1997); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1997); KY. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(3) (1997); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(4) (1997); MICH. RULES OF
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exception for disclosures to comply with other law. Thirteen jurisdictions286
PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(2) (1997); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2)
(1997); Miss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c) (1997); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(c)(3) (1997); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4(c)(3) (1997); N.D. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(g) (1997); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c) (1997);
TEX. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.05(c)(4) (1997); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(4) (1996); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1997) (allowing
disclosure pursuant to court order).
286. ARIz. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6(b) (1997); HAw.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)
(Supp. 1997); NEV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 156 (1997); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); OKLA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c) (1997); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997); TEx.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.05(e), (f) (1997); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule
20:1.6(b) (1997). Additionally, although Virginia currently follows the Model Code, it requires
disclosure in specified circumstances. VA. CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1996).
Virginia is currently in the process of adopting its own version of the Model Rules. Virginia's
proposed Rule 1.6 continues to require disclosure in those specified circumstances. See Pro-
posed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 51, at 46-49. The Virginia proposed
rule provides a particularly well-balanced approach to disclosure of confidential client informa-
tion. Virginia's proposed rule states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law or other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are im-
pliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in
paragraphs (b) and (c).
(b) To the extent a lawyer reasonably believes necessary, the lawyer may
reveal:
(1) such information to comply with law or a court order;
(2) such information to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer
in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concern-
ing the lawyer's representation of the client;
(3) such information which clearly establishes that the client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated upon a third party a fraud related to
the subject matter of the representation;
(c) A lawyer shall promptly reveal.:
(1) the intention of a client, as stated by the client, to commit a crime and
the information necessary to prevent the crime, but before revealing such
information, the attorney shall, where feasible, advise the client of the possible
legal consequences of the action, urge the client not to commit the crime, and
advise the client that the attorney must reveal the client's criminal intention
unless thereupon abandoned, and, if the crime involves perjury by the client,
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 117 (1998)
made attorney disclosures of client information mandatory in some circum-
stances by substituting "shall reveal" or similar language in place of the Rule's
permissive language "may reveal." '87 Sixjurisdictions rejected the breadth of
the Model Rules term "information" by substituting language reminiscent of
the Model Code ("confidences and secrets") in their statement of prohibi-
tion.288 Twenty-two jurisdictions broadened the exemption for future crimes
by deleting the adjective "imminent" from "death."2 9 In an even more impor-
tant departure from the Model Rule, sixteen states allow disclosure to prevent
a crime without a requirement that the crime be one that the attorney reason-
ably believes will result in death or bodily injury.90 Of these, fifteen states
that the attorney shall seek to withdraw as counsel;
(2) information which clearly establishes that the client has, in the course
of the representation, perpetrated a fraud related to the subject matter of the
representation upon atribunal. Before revealing such information, however, the
lawyer shall request that the client advise the tribunal of the fraud. For the
purposes of this paragraph and paragraph (b)(3), information is clearly estab-
lished when the client acknowledges to the attorney that the client has perpe-
trated a fraud; ....
Id. at 46-47.
287. The New Mexico Rule states that a lawyer "should reveal" client information when
a client's crime is likely to result in imminent death or serious harm. N.M. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 16-106 (1997).
288. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); N.C. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997) (prohibiting disclosure of"confidential information" except
as permitted); TEX. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.05 (1997); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997).
289. See ARiz. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997); ARK. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1996); COLO. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997);
FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6 (1997); HAw. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule
1.6(c)(1) (1997); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (Supp. 1997); IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); KAN.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1997); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(4) (1997); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (1997); MIss. RULESOFPROF'L CONDUCTRule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); N.H.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule
4(c)(4) (1997); OKLA. RULESOFPROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); S.C. RULESOFPROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); TEx. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.05(c)(7) (1997);
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1996); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 20:1.6(b) (1997); WYO. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1997).
290. See ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1996); COLO. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4-1.6 (1997);
IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6
(1996); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(4) (1997); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (1997);
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have further broadened the exception by deleting "substantial" as a qualifier
on "bodily harm."29 ' Eleven jurisdictions have added protection for the
financial interest of third parties.292 Eight jurisdictions include "fraudulent"
as well as criminal acts within the exception for harm, extending greater
protection to third parties. 93 Thirteen jurisdictions allow disclosures to
"rectify fraud" when the attorney's services have been used to further a
fraud.294
MISS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); N.C. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTRule
4(c)(4) (1997); OKLA. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCTRule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); S.C.RULESOFPROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); TEX. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.05(c)(7) (1997);
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1996); WYO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1997).
Florida unhooks the elements of the nature of the act and its results. It allows disclosure
to prevent a crime, deleting any qualifying language to limit the category of "crime." It also
allows disclosure "to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another." This separate
category of disclosure achieves the protection of third parties advocated in Part VI.C. of this
Article.
291. See ARK. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1996); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1996); ILL.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (Supp. 1997) (substituting "serious bodily harm" for
"substantial"); IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1996); KAN. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); MIcH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(4) (1997);
MrNN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (1997); Miss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4(c)(4) (1997); OKLA. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1)
(1997); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1996); WYO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997). As
noted above, sixteen states deleted reference to "bodily harm" as an element required to justify
disclosure.
292. ALASKARULE OFPROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1997-98); CONN. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1) (1997); HAW. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)
(1997); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1997); N.M.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 16-106(c) (1997); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule
1.6(d) (1997); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1) (1997); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1996); Wis. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT Rule 20:1.6(b) (1997).
293. ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (Michie 1997-98); HAw. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1)
(1997); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1997); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(d) (1997); TEX. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.05(c) (1997); UTAH RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1996); Wis. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 20:1.6(b) (1997).
294. CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(2) (1997); HAw. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997); MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1997); MCH.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(3) (1997); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1997); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1) (1997); N.C. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4(d)(5) (1997); N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(f) (1997);
OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1997); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
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B. The Restatement Rule
The American Law Institute (ALI) is one of the most respected and
influential legal institutions in this country. Founded in 1923 with the purpose
of promoting "the clarification and simplification of the law,, 295 the ALI has
participated in the development of substantive law - both common law and
statutory law. It has published a series ofrestatements, clarifying the common
law, 96 and it has drafted model acts and uniform laws, including the Uniform
Commercial Code. 97 Through the Restatement (Third) of the Law - The Law
Governing Lawyers, the ALI has articulated standards for judging lawyer
conduct, including a standard on the attorney's duty ofconfidentiality 98 The
most recent statement of this duty by the ALI is found in Proposed Final Draft
No. 1 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law - The Law Governing Lawyers.299
While the Restatement treatment of confidentiality follows the same frame-
work of general prohibition and limited exceptions found in the Model Rules,
it differs from the Rules in significant ways.
The Proposed Restatement Rule (PRR) defines the scope of the duty of
confidentiality by reference to the attorney-client relationship. Section 111
states the definition of confidential information: "Confidential client informa-
tion consists of information relating to that client, acquired by a lawyer or
agent of the lawyer in the course of or as the result of representing the client,
other than information that is generally known.""13 ' This definition is suffi-
ciently broad to protect the client's interests. It is narrower, however, than the
reference to "information" of Model Rule 1.6 which declares that a "lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client,"'3 ' including
essentially all conceivable data about a client regardless of its source.
The PRR states a general duty to safeguard client information and
prohibits the use of client information when "there is a reasonable prospect
Rule 1.6(c)(2) (1997); TEX. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.05(c)(8) (1997); UTAH RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1996); WIs. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 20:1.6(c)
(1997).
295. American Law Institute Certificate oflncorporation, quoted in AMERICANLAWINST.,
WHAT LAW STUDENTS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (pamphlet).
296. Between 1923 and 1944, the ALI published the first set of restatements. Beginning
in 1952, the ALI has published the second series of restatements relating to the common law.
Id. The restatements have also encouraged greater uniformity among courts of the different
jurisdictions.
297. Id.
298. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW- THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
299. Id.
300. Id. § 111.
301. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(a).
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that doing so will adversely affect a material interest of the client or if the
client has instructed the lawyer not to use or disclose such information. 30 2
The PRR presents exceptions to the prohibition against disclosure in Section
11 7A. This section provides as follows:
(1) A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when and
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent:
(a) death or serious bodily injury from occurring as the result of a
crime that the client has committed or intends to commit; or
(b) substantial financial loss from occurring as the result of a crime or
fraud that the client has committed or intends to commit [and in the
commission of which the lawyer's services were or are being em-
ployed].
(2) In a situation described in Subsection (1), if the client has acted at the
time the lawyer learns of the threat of an injury or loss to a victim, use or
disclosure is permissible only if the injury or loss has not yet occurred.
(3) Beforeusingordisclosinginformationpursuantto Subsection (1) or(2),
if feasible, the lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the client
either not to act or, if the client has already acted, to warn the victim.3 3
The PRR makes several changes in the elements of the exception. These
additions are similar to those instituted by many of the jurisdictions that
changed the language of Model Rule 1.6." The PRR does not require that
death be "imminent" to allow disclosure,0 5 and it allows disclosure of a future
or past crime so long as the injury or loss has not yet occurred. 6 With
respect to disclosures of fraud, the Rule adds substantial financial loss to the
interests protected and allows disclosure of future or past fraud.
302. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW- THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs § 112 (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). Section 112 of the Restatement states as follows:
Lawyer's Duty To Safeguard Confidential Client Information.
(I) Except as provided in §§ 113-1 17A, during and after representation of a client:
(a) the lawyer may not use or disclose confidential client information as defined
in § III ....
(b) the lawyer must take steps reasonable in the circumstances to protect
confidential client information against impermissible use or disclosure by the
lawyer's associates or agents that may adversely affect a material interest of the
client or otherwise than as instructed by the client.
Id.
303. Id § 117A.
304. See supra Part VI.B.
305. SeeRETATEMENT(T-ImD)OFTHELAW-THELAWGovERNINGLAwYERs § I I7A(l)(a)
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). Inclusion of the term "imminent" in the Model Rule is a
make-weight intended to discourage any conceivable disclosure of client information.
306. Id. § 117A(1)-(2). Presumably, the timing provision is intended to allow disclosures
when it is still possible to prevent the injury or loss.
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Although the PRR statement of exceptions does not unlock the pairing
of the dual requirements of criminal intent and ultimate harm presented in
Rule 1.6, Section 117A seems to moot the problem as a practical matter. Like
Rule 1.6, Section 117A allows disclosure based on the risk of "death or
serious bodily injury" to a third person only when the harm occurs as a result
of a crime." 7 The section does not include reference to fraud in conjunction
with death or serious bodily injury. Thus, it does not include a basis for
disclosure of a fraud that would result in death or bodily harm. It does,
however, add a basis for disclosure for financial loss resulting from fraud.
Thus, applying this section to the introductory hypothetical of a client seeking
to transfer contaminated property by defrauding a purchaser, PRR does not
empower the attorney to reveal the fraud based on the danger to personal
safety, but it does empower the attorney to reveal information necessary to
prevent a "substantial financial loss" resulting from such fraud. Such loss is,
of course, also likely, and so the problem may be mooted by the Restatement
rule. The possibility that fraud could result in personal injury or death does
not appear to be within the contemplation of PRR 117A.
Like the old ABA Model Code," 8 the PRR expressly acknowledges the
lawyer's right to disclose confidential client information "when required by
law."3 9 Exercise of this right is allowed under the Restatement Rule only
after the lawyer has taken "reasonably appropriate steps to assert that the
information is privileged or otherwise protected against disclosure.""3 0 Section
115 provides as follows:
§ 115. Using or Disclosing Information When Required by Law.
A lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information when required
by law, after the lawyer takes reasonably appropriate steps to assert that
the information is privileged or otherwise protected against disclosure.3 '
This statement provides clear authority for an attorney to disclose infor-
mation when necessary to comply with law. It achieves the protection for
clients by its reference to the attorney's obligation to "take appropriate steps"
to protect the information. The provision provides an independent basis for
307. Under Section 117A, the crime may be either intended in the future or already com-
mitted so long as the harm from the crime has not yet occurred (and thus, presumably can be
averted). See id. § 117A(1)(a).
308. The Code provides: "A lawyer may reveal ... [c]onfidences or secrets when per-
mitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order." MODEL CODE DR
4-101(C)(2).
309. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF THE LAW - THa LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 115
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
310. Id.
311. Id.
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disclosure, speaking to situations not covered by Section 117A. Thus, there
is no need for a showing of serious harm to justify a disclosure under this
section.
In contrast to the ABA representational slant, the ALI approaches the
issue from a substantive angle. Like the straightforward legal advisor, the
PRR views the issue of confidentiality within the context of law. It gives
weight to the interests that can be injured by attorney silence. Positive law,
both statutory and common law, represent these interests. The rules proposed
by the ALI incorporate consideration of the interests that a court will balance
when a third party challenges attorney silence.
The ABA Model Rules approach reflects the vision of lawyering that it
adopts: that of a champion attorney sometimes referred to as the "hired gun."
This view takes the client's interest as paramount and discounts other compet-
ing interests; it envisions the public good from the side of the attorney and
client's interest and disregards the competing interest of third parties put at
risk by client conduct. This approach takes an optimistic view of the attor-
ney's potential liability. It unhinges the inquiry of attorney confidentiality
from positive law, minimizing the force of law.
This is a dangerous approach by the institutional representative of attor-
neys. Like the attorney who soothes the client and omits bad news of poten-
tial liability, the ABA Rule assumes that a court will see a future controversy
solely from its perspective, blinking at competing interests as negligible.
Attorneys should know, however, that the other side of most contests has
weight and that the court, as neutral arbiter, will see both interests and balance
these interests dispassionately. Rarely is a controversy so one-sided that abso-
lute rules serve the purpose ofjustice.312 The attorney who simply refers to
312. The American system ofjustice is not monolithic. It applies general rules, with well-
defined exceptions for cases in which application of the general rule would result in an unjust
outcome. Even the First Amendment to the Constitution is not absolute; it allows for limitations
on speech to respond to situations of peril. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554
(1965) (stating that free speech and assembly, "while fundamental in our democratic society,
still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any
public place and at any time"); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) (noting that
right of free speech is "not an unlimited, unqualified right, but that the societal value of speech
must, on occasion, be subordinatedto othervalues and considerations"); American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950) (noting "clear and present danger" exception
to First Amendment guarantee of free speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571 (1942) ("[T]he right offree speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.");
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protections of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic.").
Exceptions also qualify statutes and common law principles. See, e.g, Montana v.
Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2017 (1996) (finding no categorical right to offer incompetent
evidence); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280,288 (1995) (finding thatstatute's express
preemption clause does not establish categorical rule that no implied preemption exists though
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the reasons a court should favor her client's view fails to provide objective
analysis of the potential outcomes of a controversy in court. Similarly, the
ABA, as counselor for the community of lawyers, has opted for the optimistic
outlook. It enunciates the interest in confidentiality as atranscendentbenefit,
3 13
urges courts to refuse to reexamine the attorney's decision to maintain
silence," 4 and discounts competing interests." 5
Like the state modifications, the PRR provides a truer balance of the
interests at stake in this area. These standards employ different formulations
of the duty and exceptions, but each tempers the prohibition against disclosure
with viable exceptions to protect nonclient interests. The ABA should heed
the messages from the ALI and state legislatures in their rejection of the
formulation of the duty of confidentiality set forth in Model Rule 1.6.
C. Recrafting Model Rule 1.6
The law adopted by legislatures in environmental laws and regulations
and endorsed by courts through the common law of torts create special prob-
lems for attorneys in environmental practice. Close scrutiny of the interaction
of substantive laws and the duties imposed by the applicable rules of ethics is
necessary for attorneys who engage in environmental practice. Difficult
balancing is, of course, required. Does a work practice create a significant
risk of a Bhopal-type catastrophe? Or is it merely a regulatory violation
creating an insignificant or cumulative risk? Some would argue that this
indeterminacy makes any standard endorsing disclosure unworkable. Never-
theless, this is the balancing tort law requires of other professionals and,
indeed, of every person via the general duty to refrain from creating an
unreasonable risk of harm to another.
Rule 1.6 may come as close as any rule in our system to an absolute rule.
Its flat prohibition, narrow exception for harm to others, 316 and cautionary
comments" 7 encourage silence without regard to the facts of the case. The
it supports such inference); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (concluding that
accused has no "unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise
inadmissible under standard rules of evidence").
313. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6 cmt. 9; see also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying
text.
314. See LEGiSLATIVEHlSTORY, supra note29, at23; see also supra note 77 and accompa-
nying text.
315. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt. 1; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text
316. Based on the assurance of Comment 9 of Rule 1.6 that nondisclosure is not a viola-
tion, one could argue that the exceptions presented in the Rule are illusory rather than merely
constrained.
317. See Russell, supra note 59, at409.
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ABA may have adopted the categorical prohibition of Rule 1.6 in part because
of the problem of indeterminacy. But indeterminacy may not justify a cate-
gorical prohibition when harm to another will result. Tort principles require
that all professionals 318 (and all people) make difficultjudgments in indetermi-
nate circumstances.319 Like the psychologist in Tarasoff, the attorney must
make the determination to the best of her abilities, based on the facts known
at the time.32°
Because confidentiality is the central tradition32' in the world of attor-
neys, it is unlikely that inclusion of a viable exception within the Rule will
result in inappropriate disclosures. Moreover, attorneys must consider the
concomitant potential liability for disclosing information in the mistaken
belief that the disclosure was necessary. Thus, a real exception requiring
attorneys to balance the need for disclosure against the need for secrecy is
unlikely to result in unsystematic or unprincipled disclosures.
VI Conclusion
Model Rule 1.6 creates a disjunction between positive law and the rules
of ethics, preferring the risk of improvident silence to the risk of improvident
disclosure. Based on this preference, the Rule encourages attorney silence in
virtually all circumstances. It recognizes harm to others only in the rarest of
circumstances; it permits permissive disclosure only when the attorney finds
the confluence of two elements: (1) the most culpable conduct by the client
(a criminal act), and (2) ultimate harm to a third party (imminent death or
318. See Durflingerv. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888,904-06 (10th Cir. 1984).
The Court recognizes that it may be difficult for medical professionals to predict
whether a particular mental patient may pose a danger to himself or others. This
factor alone, however, does not justify barring recovery in all situations. The
standard of care for health professionals adequately takes into account the difficult
nature of the problem facing psychotherapists.
Id. at 904 (imposing duty on hospitals to guard against their patients' dangerous mental condi-
tions when condition is discoverable by exercise of reasonable care); see also Foley v. Bishop
Clarkson Mem. Hosp., 173 N.W.2d 881, 884-85 (Neb. 1970).
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yering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUc. 313,
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320. See Shelly Stucky Watson, Keeping Secrets that Harm Others: Medical Standards
Illuminate Lawyer's Dilemma, 71 NEB.L.REv. 1123, 1132 (1992) (noting thatneither psycho-
therapists' nor attorney's "inaccuracy in predicting violence" should preclude duty to warn in
clear cases).
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substantial bodily harm). But legislation makes clear that controlling environ-
mental risks is a compelling governmental interest. Additionally, modem tort
law has moved from status-based rules such as the bar of privity to case-by-
case determination of the interests.
Rule 1.6 assumes that its transcendent benefits outweigh any harm third
parties will suffer when attorneys remain silent. It further assumes that an
attorney has no duty to protect nonclient interests. Environmental hazards
challenge the first assumption because the gravity of harm they present makes
silence particularly costly. Developments in positive law challenge the second
assumption. Modem law has moved toward requiring broader protection of
others. Positive law (created by both courts and legislatures) recognizes negli-
gent conduct can be sufficiently culpable to deserve liability for harm. Addi-
tionally, positive law mandates disclosure in some cases.
To cure the disjunction between its statement of confidentiality and posi-
tive law, the ABA should recast Model Rule 1.6. As recast, the Rule should
achieve a formulation like that of the ALI Proposed Restatement Rule, main-
taining a strong prohibition against disclosure but creating viable exceptions.
This reconceptualization of the duty of confidentiality does not mean the
attorney should assume the role of watchdog of his clients. Rather, the pattern
set by the ALI Proposed Rule and the rule advocated here empowers the
attorney to respond to extreme circumstances to protect others and to maintain
his own character as an upright person. These changes would promote an
analysis of competing interests consistent with tort and statutory law, allowing
attorneys to disclose client information to avert significant harm to others and
to comply with the mandates of positive law.
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